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I.  INTRODUCTION 
President Obama signed the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (“ACA” or “Act”),1 saying that it stood for “the core prin-
ciple that everybody should have some basic security when it 
comes to their health care.”2  The ACA’s most visible goal is to ex-
pand access to health benefit coverage to a majority of the unin-
  
 * Edward R. Utley Professor of Health Law, Boston University School of Public 
Health, Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law, Professor of Socio-Medical 
Sciences, Boston University School of Medicine. 
 1. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 21, 25, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.), amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act 
of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (codified in scattered sections of 20, 26, and 42 
U.S.C.).   
 2. Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Robert Pear, Obama Signs Health Care Overhaul Bill, with 
a Flourish, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2010, at A19.     
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sured.3  Nonetheless, underlying this goal is an equally important 
objective:  “bending the cost curve” or reducing the rate of increase 
in health care costs, which total about $2.6 trillion or almost 
eighteen percent of GDP.4  The President and many economists 
saw controlling health care costs as an important step toward eco-
nomic recovery.5  Although the Act does not directly regulate the 
costs of care, many of its provisions are intended to develop new 
ways to slow both public and private spending for health care, es-
pecially for chronic diseases,6 which are reported to account for the 
  
 3. See PAUL STARR, REMEDY AND REACTION:  THE PECULIAR AMERICAN STRUGGLE 
OVER HEALTH REFORM 239-41 (2011); Theodore Marmor et al., The Obama Administra-
tion’s Options for Health Care Cost Control:  Hope Versus Reality, 150 ANNALS INTERN. 
MED. 485, 485 (2009); COMM. ON HEALTH INSURANCE STATUS AND ITS CONSEQUENCES, 
INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, AMERICA’S UNINSURED CRISIS:  CONSEQUENCES FOR HEALTH 
AND HEALTH CARE 49 (2009) (“[H]ealth insurance coverage is integral to health care access 
and health.”).  
 4. David M. Cutler et al., Why Health Reform Will Bend the Cost Curve, 
COMMONWEALTH FUND, Dec. 7, 2009, 6, available at http://www.common-
wealthfund.org/Publications/Issue-Briefs/2009/Dec/Why-Health-Reform-Will-Bend-the-Cost 
-Curve.aspx; Anne B. Martin et al., Growth in US Health Spending Remained Slow in 
2010; Health Share of Gross Domestic Product Was Unchanged from 2009, 31 HEALTH 
AFFS. 208, 208-09 & exhibit 1 (2012).  The Act includes a finding by the Senate that “this 
Act will reduce the Federal deficit between 2010 and 2019.”  Patient Protection and Afford-
able Care Act § 1563.  
 5. Barack Obama, President of the U.S., Remarks by the President in State of the 
Union Address (Jan. 27, 2010) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/remarks-president-state-union-address).  See David M. Mirvis & David E. 
Bloom, Population Health and Economic Development in the United States, 300 JAMA 93, 
95 (2008) (finding that improved population health is associated with increased economic 
growth); Sheila  D. Smith et al., Income, Insurance, and Technology:  Why Does Health 
Spending Outpace Economic Growth?, 28 HEALTH AFFS. 1276 (2009). 
 6. See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1003 (authorizing Secretary 
of the Department of Health and Human Services to review insurance premiums for “un-
reasonable increases” and to provide grants to states to conduct reviews or rate setting); id. 
§ 1103 (limiting Medicare Advantage plans’ medical loss ratios to 85% of premiums); id. §§ 
1311-1331 (creation of health insurance exchanges to offer competitively priced health 
insurance plans); id. § 1421 (small business tax credit for employee health insurance); id. § 
1561 (standards for electronic enrollment in government programs); id. § 2551 (reductions 
in federal Medicaid funding for disproportionate share hospitals); id. § 2601 (grants for 
demonstrations projects to coordinate care for persons eligible for both Medicare and Medi-
caid (“dual eligibles”)); id. § 2602 (improve coordination of benefits for dual eligibles); id. § 
2701 (authorizing Medicaid waivers to create medical homes to provide cost-effective, coor-
dinated care); id. § 2702 (prohibiting Medicaid payments for inappropriate diagnoses); id. 
§§ 2704-2706 (authorizing grants for demonstration projects with Medicaid providers to 
test bundled payments, global payment systems, and pediatric accountable care organiza-
tions); id. § 2801 (amending the Medicaid and State Children’s Health Insurance Program 
payment and access provisions); id. § 3001 (authorizing value-based purchasing of services 
for Medicare beneficiaries from hospitals that meet performance standards); id. § 3004 
(providing that long-term care hospitals that fail to submit reports forfeit Medicare rate 
increases); id. § 3006 (authorizing development of value-based payments by Medicare to 
skilled nursing facilities, home health agencies, and ambulatory surgical centers); id. § 
3007 (authorizing adjustments to Medicare payments to physicians based on cost and qual-
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majority of health care costs,7 as well as almost two-thirds of an-
nual deaths in the United States.8   
Conventional wisdom argues that most chronic diseases are 
caused by behavioral factors, such as lack of physical activity, poor 
  
ity of care); id. § 3008 (reducing Medicare payments to hospitals for hospital acquired medi-
cal conditions); id. § 3021 (creating the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation “to 
test innovative payment and service delivery models to reduce program expenditures”); id. 
§ 3022 (authorizing shared savings with Medicare and Medicaid providers who create ac-
countable care organizations that meet quality and cost targets); id. § 3023 (authorizing 
pilot program for bundled Medicare payments); id. § 3024 (authorizing demonstration pro-
ject to test Medicare payment incentive and service delivery models for primary care); id. § 
3025 (reducing Medicare payments for certain hospital readmissions); id. § 3102 (adjusting 
Medicare physician payment calculations); id. §§ 3131-3132 (adjusting Medicare payments 
for home health care and hospice care); id. § 3133 (reducing Medicare payments to dispro-
portionate share hospitals); id. § 3134 (providing for review and adjustment of Medicare 
physician payment claims); id. §§ 3135, 3136 (limiting Medicare payments for imaging and 
powered wheel chairs); id. § 3138 (proving for study of cancer hospital costs); id. § 3139 
(limiting Medicare payments for generic biologics); id. § 3140 (authorizing demonstration 
projects of Medicare hospice program models); id. § 3201 (amending Medicare Advantage 
payment method); id. § 3313 (authorizing Inspector General to study prescription drug 
prices for Medicare Part D covered drugs); id. § 3401 (amending market basket bases and 
adding productivity requirements to Medicare payment calculations); id. § 3403 (creating 
Medicare Payment Advisory Board to “reduce the per capita rate of growth in Medicare 
spending”); id. § 3501 (expanding Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality’s authority 
to conduct research on health care quality, safety and value); id. §§ 5001–5701 (including 
provisions to encourage students to enter primary care, nursing, geriatrics, public health, 
and allied health professions); id. § 6001 (tightening limitations on physician self-referrals); 
id. § 6301 (creating an independent Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute to study 
the effectiveness of medical care); id. § 10606 (increasing penalties for health care fraud).  
See also, MATTHEW BUETTGENS ET AL., AMERICA UNDER THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 11 
(2010), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412267-america-under-aca.pdf 
(estimating savings in the cost of uncompensated care).   
 7. About 50 million Americans have some kind of disability and about 10 million re-
ceived Supplemental Security Income (SSI) or Social Security Disability Insurance.  More 
Than 50 Million Americans Report Some Level of Disability, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (May 12, 
2006), http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/aging_population/cb06-71.html.  
See Kenneth E. Thorpe et al., Chronic Conditions Account for Rise in Medicare Spending 
from 1987 to 2006, 29 HEALTH AFFS. 718 (2010); Catherine Hoffman et al., Persons with 
Chronic Conditions:  Their Prevalence and Costs, 276 JAMA 1473, 1476 (1996).  See also 
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, HOW DOES OBESITY IN ADULTS AFFECT SPENDING ON HEALTH 
CARE? (Sept. 8, 2010), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/118xx/doc11810/09-08-
Obesity_brief.pdf. 
 8. Heart disease, cancers, stroke, chronic respiratory diseases, Alzheimer’s disease, 
and diabetes caused 64.5% of deaths in 2009.  Kenneth D. Kochanek et al., Deaths:  Pre-
liminary Data for 2009, 59 NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP. 1, 5, 29 tbl.29 (2011), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr59/nvsr59_04.pdf.  Chronic disease costs may also 
threaten the global economy.  DAVID E. BLOOM ET AL., THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC BURDEN OF 
NON-COMMUNICABLE DISEASES 35 (2011), available at http://www3.weforum.org/docs/ 
WEF_Harvard_HE_GlobalEconomicBurdenNonCommunicableDiseases_2011.pdf (a report 
for the World Economic Forum, estimating that heart disease, stroke, cancers, chronic 
respiratory diseases, diabetes, and mental illness account for 63% of deaths worldwide 
(72% in high income countries) and could cost a total of $30 trillion worldwide between now 
and 2030). 
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diet, and alcohol and tobacco use.9  It is not surprising, therefore, 
that policy recommendations to control chronic disease costs em-
phasize policies to change such behaviors.10  The ACA follows this 
trend.  Its provisions regulating both public and private insurance 
include required coverage of preventive care without patient cost 
sharing and authorization to provide incentives for individuals to 
participate in wellness programs.11  While these provisions are 
generally applauded as promoting good health, their potential for 
discriminating against people who are overweight, poor, disadvan-
taged or have chronic ailments has begun to raise concern.12  
This article examines whether insurance is an appropriate 
mechanism for improving individual health or reducing the cost of 
health care for payers, and if so, what principles can guide the 
design of insurance for either purpose.  Insurance is the quintes-
sential tool for spreading and managing risk.  However, insurance 
  
 9. See, e.g., INST. OF MED., LEADING HEALTH INDICATORS FOR HEALTHY PEOPLE 
2020—LETTER REPORT (2011), available at http://iom.edu/Reports/2011/Leading-Health-
Indicators-for-Healthy-People-2020.aspx; NAT’L CTR. FOR CHRONIC DISEASE PREVENTION 
AND HEALTH PROMOTION, THE POWER OF PREVENTION:  CHRONIC DISEASE . . . THE PUBLIC 
HEALTH CHALLENGE OF THE 21ST CENTURY (2009), available at http://www.cdc.gov/ 
chronicdisease/pdf/2009-Power-of-Prevention.pdf; WORLD HEALTH ORG., GLOBAL STATUS 
REPORT ON NON-COMMUNICABLE DISEASES 2010 (2011), available at http://www. 
who.int/nmh/publications/ncd_report2010/en/.  The seminal work identifying behavioral 
risk factors as the underlying cause of many diseases is J. Michael McGinnis & William F. 
Foege, Actual Causes of Death in the United States, 270 JAMA 2207 (1993). 
 10. See, e.g., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, NAT’L CTR. FOR CHRONIC 
DISEASE PREVENTION & HEALTH PROMOTION, AT A GLANCE 2010:  HEALTH RISKS IN THE 
UNITED STATES:  BEHAVIORAL RISK FACTOR SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM, available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/chronicdisease/resources/publications/AAG/brfss.htm; NAT’L CTR. FOR 
HEALTH STATISTICS, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, HEALTHY PEOPLE 2010 
FINAL REVIEW LHI-3-9 (2011), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hpdata2010/ 
hp2010_final_review.pdf (reporting that the top 10 “leading health indicators” were physi-
cal activity, nutrition and obesity, tobacco use, substance abuse, responsible sexual behav-
ior, mental health, injury and violence, environmental quality, immunization, and access to 
health care).  But see Leading Health Indicators:  2020 LHI Topics, HEALTHY PEOPLE.GOV, 
http://www.healthypeople.gov/2020/LHI/2020indicators.aspx (last updated Jan. 25, 2012) 
(reversing the order of many indicators to lead with access to health care, clinical preven-
tive services, and environmental quality).  
 11. See infra Part III. 
 12. See, e.g., Jennifer Bard, When Public Health and Genetic Privacy Collide:  Positive 
and Normative Theories Explaining How ACA’s Expansion of Corporate Wellness Programs 
Conflicts with GINA’s Privacy Rules, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 469 (2011); Nurit Guttmann, 
On Being Responsible:  Ethical Issues in Appeals to Personal Responsibility in Health Cam-
paigns, 6 J. HEALTH COMM. 117 (2010); Kristin M. Madison et al., The Law, Policy, and 
Ethics of Employers’ Use of Financial Incentives to Improve Health, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 
450 (2011); Wendy K. Mariner, Social Solidarity and Personal Responsibility in Health 
Reform, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 199 (2008); Mark A. Rothstein & Heather L. Harrell, Health 
Risk Reduction Programs in Employer-Sponsored Health Plans:  Part II—Law and Ethics, 
51 J. OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL MED. 951 (2009); Robert Steinbrook, Imposing Personal 
Responsibility for Health, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 753, 753 (2006). 
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risk management targets financial losses or costs; it is not typi-
cally designed to improve the policyholder’s physical or mental 
wellbeing (beyond the presumed “peace of mind” of having insur-
ance).13  At the same time, insurance does play a significant role in 
shaping public attitudes toward responsibility for health risks,14 as 
described in Part II.  I argue that, by establishing a new, seem-
ingly universal design for the medical care that society should 
make available and what individuals should do to protect their 
own health, the ACA contains implicit standards for the allocation 
of responsibility for health.  Part III briefly describes the ACA’s 
provisions governing preventive care coverage and wellness pro-
grams that suggest these implicit standards.  In practice, wellness 
programs typically seek to change a limited set of personal traits, 
like obesity, or behaviors, like smoking.  Thus, Part IV summa-
rizes the evidence of the effects of preventive care and employee 
wellness programs, which suggest somewhat more success in mak-
ing people feel better than in reducing costs.  
Because insurance provides the financial foundation for so 
many institutions in the national economy, Part V explores how 
the ACA’s use of insurance to encourage personal responsibility 
for risk prevention may influence social attitudes and policies 
about conditions of employment, housing, and social relationships.  
A different approach, using community-based programs instead of 
insurance-based wellness programs, is discussed in Part V.  I con-
clude, in Part VI, that health promotion should be encouraged, 
because health is valuable for its own sake.  Insurance, however, 
is poorly suited to improve health or manage behavioral risks to 
health.  Rather, it operates best as a mechanism for financing ac-
cess to preventive care without cost-sharing.  Although insurance 
can determine actuarially fair premiums, its tools are too crude to 
attribute to specific behaviors the health care costs of chronic con-
ditions with complex causes.  Characterizing ill health as the 
product of individual choice—an individual responsibility—poses 
credible risks to the legal rights and economic conditions of many 
disadvantaged populations in the United States.  Wellness pro-
grams that reward good health or penalize unhealthy behaviors 
are likely to shape public perceptions of individual social worth 
  
 13. See Tom Baker, Constructing the Insurance Relationship:  Sales Stories, Claims 
Stories, and Insurance Contract Damages, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1395, 1401, 1405 (1994). 
 14. Mariner, supra note 12; SMOKING POLICY:  LAW, POLITICS & CULTURE 6, 185-88 
(Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman, eds., 1993). 
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and justify abusive practices, such as denying employment, on the 
pretext of improving public health.  If such programs are to offer 
the benefits of improved health without marginalizing a growing 
population, the laws governing health insurance plans should not 
permit individual financial rewards or penalties for wellness pro-
gram participation.  Instead, such programs should be offered in-
dependently of insurance. 
II.  INSURANCE REFLECTS AND SHAPES CONCEPTIONS OF 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR RISK 
Insurance underpins most of the American—indeed the global—
economy, making it possible for businesses to operate normally as 
well as to take entrepreneurial risks.15  Few businesses can oper-
ate without several types of insurance, including general liability, 
directors’ liability, and casualty insurance.  By setting conditions 
on issuing such policies and requiring the performance of other 
conditions after issuance, insurers influence financial and com-
mercial behavior.  Like most insurers, health insurers often obtain 
reinsurance and design their policies to meet the requirements of 
the reinsurer.16  Even common personal and social activities, such 
as buying a motor vehicle and obtaining a home mortgage, require 
the purchase of insurance as a condition precedent.  Jeffrey Stem-
pel summarizes the breadth and depth of this influence, conclud-
ing that “[i]nsurance policies serve a function in the social order-
ing of personal and economic activity. . . . [T]hey serve as part of 
the infrastructure by which such activity is conducted.” 17   
The influence of insurance is beginning to be seen as a form of 
governance itself.18  National social welfare systems for pensions, 
unemployment compensation, and health care operate as insur-
ance systems and may use private insurers to administer costs 
  
 15. For histories of insurance, see JOHN A. BOGARDUS, JR., SPREADING THE RISKS:  
INSURING THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE (2003) and ANDREW TOBIAS, THE INVISIBLE BANKERS 
(1992). 
 16. Reinsurance is insurance for insurers.  Insurance companies transfer some of the 
risk they assumed from policyholders to a reinsurance company.  ROBERT H. JERRY II, 
UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW, § 140a, 1015 (4th ed. 2007); Aviva Abramovsky, Rein-
surance:  The Silent Regulator?, 15  CONN. INS. L.J. 345, 350 (2009).  
 17. Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Social Instrument and Social Institu-
tion, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1489, 1497 (2010). 
 18. RICHARD V. ERICSON ET AL., INSURANCE AS GOVERNANCE 45 (2003) (initiating socio-
logical research on insurance as an institution of governance by private entities and de-
scribing the results of the empirical study). 
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and claims.19  Of course, governments also authorize, by licensing, 
private insurers to directly underwrite specific risks, such as 
workers compensation and health benefit plans.  Increasingly, 
however, governments rely on private insurance companies to 
provide the financial security needed for commercial businesses to 
operate,20 a way of managing risks that could be considered the 
function of governments.  The insurance policy requirements serve 
to partially govern commercial operations and policyholders’ con-
duct,21 lessening the need for formal legal rules, but performing a 
similar function and without public accountability. 
Insurance governs from behind the scene. In the background, its 
influence can be invisible or taken for granted.  Yet the content of 
insurance policies shapes public opinion about acceptable risks 
and appropriate responses to risks.22  One way in which this hap-
pens is by the standardization of insurance terms.23  Most health 
insurance policies are standard form contracts.24  Standard form 
contracts have characteristics analogous to standardized product 
specifications.25  Coverage choices—which risks are covered or ex-
cluded—that are standard features of insurance policies begin to 
look like essential elements of an acceptable product, just as hav-
ing seatbelts in automobiles were regarded first as acceptable, 
  
 19. See THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL INSURANCE 1881-1981 (Peter A. Kohler & Hans 
F. Zacher eds., 1982).  Medicare, for example, contracts with private insurers to administer 
Medicare benefits.  Processing of Claims for Part A and Part B:  Enterprise Architecture, 
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 1-1 
(2006), available at www.cms.gov/MedicareContractingReform/downloads/ProcessingClaims 
forPartA&BEnterpriseArchitecture.pdf. 
 20. ERICSON ET AL., supra note 18, at 45. 
 21. Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts about Freedom of Con-
tract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 631 (1943) (describing how “standard clauses in insurance 
policies” enable insurers to “select and control risks assumed under a contract”). 
 22. See generally PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK (2000) (describing ap-
proaches to risk perception). 
 23. W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmak-
ing Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 531 (1971) (noting that almost all contracts used standard 
forms and provisions). 
 24. Wendy K. Mariner, Standards of Care and Standard Form Contracts:  Distinguish-
ing Patient Rights and Consumer Rights in Managed Care, 15 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & 
POL’Y 1, 34, 37 (1998) (arguing that most health insurance contracts should be interpreted 
as standard form contracts issued without bargaining on the part of the individual policy-
holder); Susan Randall, Freedom of Contract in Insurance, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 108 
(2007) (critiquing the emphasis on interpreting text in insurance policies).  
 25. Although most lawyers classify insurance policies as contracts, the health insur-
ance industry refers to insurance policies as “products.”  Products can be regulated to pro-
tect consumers from hidden hazards.  See Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as 
Thing, 44 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 813, 831 (2009); Daniel Schwarcz, A Products Li-
ability Theory for the Judicial Regulation of Insurance Policies, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1389, 1395 (2007).  
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then as a necessary feature. When particular product specifica-
tions become standard features, they can create an expectation 
and a social norm.  Similarly, when specific medical conditions are 
excluded from coverage or covered only at a higher premium, such 
conditions appear to be outside the norm. 
Insurance can “govern” behavior by establishing norms of con-
duct.26  The norm in insurance is constructed on the basis of em-
pirical estimates of the distribution of risk in a population, not a 
social ideal.27  The statistical mean is merely descriptive of a popu-
lation.  People with a risk profile near the mean are normal.  
However, such statistical data can be seen in moral terms, where 
normal acquires a moral meaning.  People with a risk profile at 
either extreme of the curve can be seen as outliers or even patho-
logical.28  Ian Hacking argues that awareness of risk data has 
“looping effects,” in which the knowledge of what is statistically 
normal creates pressure to be normal, narrowing the scope of 
normal and widening the range of the abnormal or excessively 
risky.29  This suggests that people may assign normative values or 
moral weight to risk probabilities.30  Moral judgments are easily 
hidden in the probabilistic language of risk, because probabilities 
appear to be objective.     
More than any other industry, insurance depends on quantify-
ing the probability of an unwanted occurrence and the probable 
harm produced if it occurs.  Insurance thus appears to transform 
danger into a manageable risk calculation.31  A manageable risk 
appears to be subject to human control.  Thus, those with higher 
risks can be seen as failing to prevent their own problems; they 
can be seen as out of control.32  For example, studies on the causes 
of car accidents led to changing the name from accident to motor 
  
 26. Deborah Stone, Beyond Moral Hazard:  Insurance as a Moral Opportunity, 6 CONN. 
INS. L.J. 11, 46 (1999-2000). 
 27. ERICSON ET AL., supra note 18, at 68-69. 
 28. IAN HACKING, THE TAMING OF CHANCE 2 (1990). 
 29. Id. 
 30. See PAUL SLOVIC, THE FEELING OF RISK:  NEW PERSPECTIVES ON RISK 
PERCEPTION (2011) (discussing various ways in which cultural factors influence percep-
tions of risk).  
 31. But see PETER L. BERNSTEIN, AGAINST THE GODS:  THE REMARKABLE STORY OF 
RISK (1998); RICHARD V. ERICSON & AARON DOYLE, UNCERTAIN BUSINESS: RISK, 
INSURANCE, AND THE LIMITS OF KNOWLEDGE  (2004) (describing the uncertainty of actuarial 
risk estimates). 
 32. For arguments that the literature on risk portrays an increasing number of risks as 
being under human control and, therefore, that the responsibility for avoiding the ensuing 
harms should belong to the individual, see JOHN ADAMS, RISK (1995) and JAMES REASON, 
HUMAN ERROR (1990).  
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vehicle crashes, to emphasize the responsibility of drivers or vehi-
cle design for safety.33  
Insurance, then, is not only a way to manage the financial cost 
of risks; it also allocates responsibility for risks.34  Responsibility is 
often thought of as falling into two categories:  personal responsi-
bility and collective responsibility—which can include broad, so-
cial or governmental responsibility and smaller, private group or 
community responsibility.35  As a form of mutual aid and collective 
responsibility, insurance influences how people perceive risks.36  If 
insurance is not available for a risk, like hurricane coverage in 
coastal Florida or investigational drugs, it suggests that the risk is 
too great or too uncertain to spread in any fair way.  Those who 
choose to live in that zone or participate in research should under-
stand that they are on their own if disaster strikes.  If insurance is 
easily available, it might suggest that the risk is small or that it is 
so common that it can be easily spread. Such risks may appear 
normal, if not enticing.  In this way, as Deborah Stone writes, in-
surance serves to identify risks that are seen as “amenable to hu-
man agency and collective action.”37  Thus, decisions about what 
risks to cover embody implicit normative judgments about what 
risks should be shared or remedied together.  Covered risks are 
seen as a collective responsibility, while excluded risks remain the 
personal responsibility of individuals. 
Whether insurance is sited in the public or private sector offers 
another clue as to whether the risks it covers are viewed as a so-
cial responsibility or a personal one.  Government-required social 
insurance systems like Social Security and unemployment insur-
ance reflect the idea that society should protect people from desti-
tution in old age or lack of work.38  The fact that life insurance re-
  
 33. Ericson et al., supra note 18, at 270. 
 34. Tom Baker, Risk, Insurance, and the Social Construction of Responsibility, in 
EMBRACING RISK:  THE CHANGING CULTURE OF INSURANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY 33 (Tom 
Baker & Jonathan Simon eds., 2002). 
 35. Id.; Mariner, supra note 12, at 205-07. 
 36. Deborah A. Stone, The Struggle for the Soul of Health Insurance, 18 J. HEALTH POL. 
POL’Y & L. 287, 279, 314 (1993).  See MARY DOUGLAS, RISK AND BLAME:  ESSAYS IN 
CULTURAL THEORY (1990).  
 37. Deborah Stone, Beyond Moral Hazard, in EMBRACING RISK:  THE CHANGING 
CULTURE OF INSURANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY 54 (Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon eds., 
2002). 
 38. Perhaps the best known arguments over social insurance are contained in Kenneth 
J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941 
(1963) (generally for) and Mark V. Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment, 58 
AM. ECON. REV. 531 (1968) (generally against). 
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mains available only from private commercial companies suggests 
that it is an option for individuals and, therefore, only a personal 
responsibility.39  The ACA’s minimum coverage requirement moves 
health insurance in the United States away from the personal re-
sponsibility model and much closer to a social insurance model.40  
In European countries with social insurance systems, the intro-
duction of competitive market reforms has sometimes raised con-
cerns that such reforms dilute the culture of solidarity.41 
As everyone knows, health insurance spreads risk by pooling 
premium revenues from all individuals in a group to pay for losses 
incurred—medical care obtained—by individuals in the group.42  
In effect, the healthy—those who incur few or no costs—subsidize 
the group members who do get care that is covered by the health 
insurance plan.  Few insurers, or policyholders for that matter, 
speak of a group insurance plan as a subsidy to the ill or un-
healthy.43  Rather, this form of subsidy appears to be accepted as 
quite normal by those who buy the coverage, suggesting that buy-
ers consider the covered risks to be matters for collective action.  
On the other hand, policyholders often seek to join the lowest risk 
(and least expensive) group, thereby disaggregating the sphere of 
collective action into smaller groups.44  Insurers in an unregulated, 
voluntary market segment the market by classifying risks into 
smaller groups.45  Thus, the strength of the spirit of solidarity may 
depend on the price of insurance and the degree to which people 
prefer not to be classified as a high risk.  Risk classification itself 
  
 39. Histories of commercial life insurance in the United States suggest that it gained 
consumer acceptance when characterized as a way for individuals to take responsibility for 
providing for their families in the event the breadwinner died.  See, e.g., VIVIANA A. 
ROTMAN ZELIZER, MORALS AND MARKETS:  THE DEVELOPMENT OF LIFE INSURANCE IN THE 
UNITED STATES (1979); Brian J. Glenn, God and the Red Umbrella: The Place of Values in 
the Creation of Institutions of Mutual Assistance, 10 CONN. INS. L.J. 277 (2004). 
 40. Wendy K. Mariner, Health Reform:  What’s Insurance Got to Do with It? Recogniz-
ing Health Insurance as a Separate Species of Insurance, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 436, 438 
(2010).   
 41. See, e.g., Karl Hinrichs, The Impact of German Health Insurance Reforms on Redis-
tribution and the Culture of Solidarity, 20 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 653 (1995); Hans 
Maarse & Aggie Paulus, Has Solidarity Survived? A Comparative Analysis of the Effect of 
Social Health Insurance Reform in Four European Countries, 28 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 
585 (2003). 
 42. See generally KENNETH S ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION (2d ed. 
1995); JERRY II, supra note 16. 
 43. Stone, supra note 36, at 292.   
 44. Mark A. Hall & Carl E. Schneider, Patients as Consumers:  Courts, Contracts, and 
the New Medical Marketplace, 106 MICH. L. REV. 643, 662 (2008). 
 45. Tom Baker, Containing the Promise of Insurance:  Adverse Selection and Risk Clas-
sification, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 371, 377 (2003).  
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may influence perceptions of responsibility for risk by encouraging 
segregation into economically favored and disfavored groups.  
The ACA is legislation that may shift Americans’ conception of 
health insurance, but insurance can also influence law.  For ex-
ample, Kenneth Abraham argues persuasively that the availabil-
ity of liability insurance enabled tort liability claims that would 
have been uncollectable in the absence of insurance.46  A common 
complaint among some economists is that insurance distorts the 
market for health care, encouraging excessive use of services and 
rising prices by removing the buyer’s awareness of the cost of 
care.47  This complaint may have limited application to medical 
services, however, because physicians, not patients, make the ma-
jor decisions about what kind of care a patient should receive.  
And, sick patients are unlikely to “shop around” for the cheapest 
hospital, whether or not they have insurance. 
Nevertheless, health insurance may influence public policy by 
suggesting that the services that are covered are a social responsi-
bility, while those that are excluded or subject to cost-sharing are 
matters of personal choice.  Social policy has influenced health 
insurance by requiring health insurers to cover many preventive 
services that would not ordinarily be covered in a conventional 
indemnity insurance policy.48  Such coverage is intended to en-
courage individuals to get the preventive services that they might 
not otherwise get, often because of cost, with the expectation that 
those services may help to prevent future illness.49  Although 
property and casualty insurers sometimes require their policy-
holders to keep their property reasonably maintained as a condi-
tion of coverage, health insurers have not required individuals to 
stay healthy as a condition of continued health insurance cover-
age.  Of course, until some state laws and now the ACA required 
guaranteed issue, insurers did not have to sell a policy to anyone 
with a preexisting condition or, alternatively, could exclude cover-
  
 46. KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE LIABILITY CENTURY:  INSURANCE AND TORT LAW FROM 
THE PROGRESSIVE ERA TO 9/11 (2008).  See also Tom Baker, Liability Insurance as Tort 
Regulation:  Six Ways That Liability Insurance Shapes Tort Law in Action, 12 CONN. INS. 
L.J. 1 (2005). 
 47. See generally Kenneth Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical 
Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941 (1963); W. Henry Chiu, Health Insurance and the Welfare of 
Health Care Consumers, 64 J. PUB. ECON. 125 (1996); Martin S. Feldstein, The Rising 
Price of Physicians’ Services, 52 REV. ECON. & STAT. 121 (1970); Martin S. Feldstein, The 
Welfare Loss of Excess Health Insurance, 81 J. POL. ECON. 251 (1973). 
 48. Mariner, supra note 40, at 445. 
 49. Id. 
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age of preexisting conditions.50  With the ACA’s new requirements, 
the question is whether health insurers and employers can require 
policyholders to “maintain” their bodies in the same way that oth-
er insurers require automobile owners to perform regular car 
maintenance.  
III.  ACA INSURANCE PROVISIONS TO PROMOTE HEALTH 
The ACA has three different approaches to promoting health:  
(1) encouraging and funding government and community research, 
education, and projects to improve health and provide health-
promoting conditions;51 (2) requiring coverage of preventive health 
services in public and private health insurance programs;52 and (3) 
authorizing both state Medicaid plans and private health insur-
ance plans, including those sponsored by employers, to offer well-
ness programs.53  The first two approaches are not controversial, 
because they offer benefits to all, without requiring participation 
  
 50. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1 (requiring guaranteed issue); § 300gg-2 (prohibiting preexisting 
condition exclusions). 
 51. Title IV of the ACA, “Prevention of Chronic Disease and Improving Public Health,” 
is one of nine substantive titles.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-148, §§ 4001-4306, 124 Stat. 119, 538-587 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 29 
and 42 U.S.C.).  Most of the sections in this title authorize federal funding for preventive 
health services, id. § 4101, 124 Stat. at 546 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 280h-4 to -5) (grants to 
operate school health centers), education, id. § 4102, 124 Stat. at 550 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 280k-3) (creating an educational campaign for oral healthcare prevention and grants for 
research on dental caries prevention), and outreach, id. § 4004, 124 Stat. at 544 (codified at 
42 U.S.C. § 300u-12) (creating an education and outreach program to “encourage[] healthy 
behaviors linked to the prevention of chronic diseases”).  A “Prevention and Public Health 
Fund” was established to pay for many of these programs.  Id. § 4002, 124 Stat. at 541 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300u-11).  The Fund, originally enacted to receive $15 billion over 
ten years ($5 billion in its first five years), may suffer from deficit budget-cutting.  Id.  The 
President has already proposed reducing the fund by $3.5 billion.  OFFICE OF MGMT. & 
BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, LIVING WITHIN OUR MEANS AND INVESTING IN 
THE FUTURE:  THE PRESIDENT’S PLAN FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEFICIT REDUCTION 
(2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/ 
fy2012/assets/jointcommitteereport.pdf. 
 52. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1001, 124 Stat. at 1301 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 300gg-13) (private coverage of preventive services); id. § 4103, 124 Stat. at 553 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(s)(2)) (Medicare coverage of annual wellness visit without 
cost sharing); id. § 4104, 124 Stat. at 557 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395x) (Medicare coverage 
of preventive services recommended by the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force); id. § 
4106, 124 Stat. at 559 (Medicaid coverage of preventive services for adults); id. § 4107, 124 
Stat. at 560 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396(d)) (coverage of tobacco cessation services for 
pregnant Medicaid beneficiaries).  An independent Preventive Services Task Force, affili-
ated with the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, was created to review and 
recommend clinical preventive services for coverage.  Id. § 4003(a), 124 Stat. at 541 (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. § 299b-4).  For services covered, see Recommendations, U.S. Preventive 
Services Task Force, www.uspreventiveservicestaskforce.org/recommendations.htm.   
 53. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a, 300gg-4.  See infra text accompanying notes 57-110.  
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or imposing financial penalties on non-participation.54  In contrast, 
the third approach allows employers and insurers to hold non-
participating or unsuccessful plan enrollees responsible for a lar-
ger share of costs than other enrollees.  These provisions use in-
surance to try to reduce individual health risks.  Although the 
ACA’s insurance regulation provisions generally eliminate risk 
segmentation within insurance pools, for example, by requiring 
guaranteed issue and coverage of preexisting conditions,55 the 
wellness program provisions reintroduce some risk segmentation 
into the plan’s pool of enrollees.56  This element has the potential 
to reshape laws governing discrimination, particularly in employ-
ment. 
The ACA’s encouragement of wellness programs expands an ex-
ception to the prohibition against discrimination among group 
health plan enrollees in the Health Insurance Portability and Ac-
countability Act (“HIPAA”).57  Although that section prohibited 
group health insurance plans from discriminating with respect to 
premiums or eligibility or benefits on the basis of “health fac-
tors,”58 it allowed plans to offer premium discounts or rebates or 
modify cost-sharing for “adherence to programs of health promo-
tion and disease prevention.”59  Regulations adopted in 2006 
fleshed out the types of programs that qualified for the exception.60 
The ACA’s version of this provision expands this exception by 
allowing insurers to offer wellness programs in both the individual 
  
 54. See § 4003(b) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 280g-10) (creating a separate Community 
Preventive Services Task Force, convened by the Centers for Disease Control and Preven-
tion, to review population-based services).   
 55. § 1201, 124 Stat. at 154 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1) (guaranteed issue); id. 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-2) (guaranteed renewability); id. (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 
300gg-3) (prohibition against preexisting condition exclusions); § 1001, 124 Stat. at 130 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-11) (prohibition on lifetime and annual limits); id. (codified at 
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-12) (prohibition on rescission).  See Mariner, supra note 12, at 222 (de-
scribing how wellness programs can reintroduce risk rating into the pool of insureds).  
 56. Mariner, supra note 12, at 222. 
 57. § 1201, 124 Stat. at 154 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4).  The original provision is 
also included in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1182 (2010) and 
the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 9802 (2006). 
 58. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4 (Supp. III 2009). Health factors were defined to include:  
“health status; medical condition (including both physical and mental illnesses); claims 
experience; receipt of health care; medical history; genetic information; evidence of insur-
ability (including conditions arising out of acts of violence); and disability.  Id.  The ACA 
changed the term “health factor” to “health status-related factors” and added “any other 
health status-related factor determined appropriate by the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services” to the definition.  42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4 (2012).  
 59. Id.; 29 U.S.C. § 1182(b)(2)(B). 
 60. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.702(f) (2011); 42 C.F.R. § 54.9802-1 (2011); 45 C.F.R. § 146.121(f) 
(2011).  See Mariner, supra note 12, at 219 (describing the 2006 regulations). 
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and group market.61  It also incorporates the requirements of the 
2006 regulations into a new subsection (j), which divides wellness 
programs into those that can be offered freely and those that must 
meet additional requirements to be considered non-discrim-
inatory.62  Several of the five categories of wellness programs that 
do not have to meet additional requirements appear to offer bene-
ficial services.63  These include programs that pay for all or part of 
membership in a fitness center or smoking cessation programs or 
that offer a reward for attending periodic health education semi-
nars.64  They also include a “program that encourages preventive 
care related to a health condition through the waiver of the co-
payment or deductible requirement under a group health plan for 
the cost of certain items or services related to a health condition 
(such as prenatal care or well-baby visits).”65  This could be a wel-
come benefit in grandfathered, employer-sponsored group health 
plans that do not waive cost-sharing for preventive services.  It is 
possible, of course, that individuals who are encouraged to use 
these services could perceive the attention as singling them out for 
their unfavorable health conditions.  Employee reactions may de-
pend on whether all employees, including individuals who are 
quite fit, are encouraged to attend health education programs and 
whether their employers track attendance.   
The last wellness program in the exempt list is one that rewards 
individuals for participating in a diagnostic testing program, as 
long as it does not base the reward on an individual’s test out-
comes.66  This seems intended to encourage people to identify any 
health problems they have, so that they can take appropriate ac-
tion.  Here again, however, if the test results are tracked by em-
ployers, employees may fear other forms of employment discrimi-
nation, either because of a discovered health problem or an indi-
vidual’s failure to treat it.  Commercial companies that sell well-
ness programs to insurers and employers often emphasize the im-
portance of screening employees for health conditions in order to 
permit personalized health promotion and disease management 
  
 61. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(a). 
 62. Id. § 300gg-4(j). 
 63. Id. § 300gg-4(j)(2). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. § 300gg-4(j)(2)(C). 
 66. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)(2)(B). 
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plans.67  Thus, a testing program is often the beginning of more 
targeted incentives directed at individual employees. 
The second category of permissible programs can offer rewards 
and penalties based on a person’s health status as long as they 
meet four relatively simple requirements.68  First, the program 
must be “reasonably designed to promote health or prevent dis-
ease.”69  However, the program also must not be “overly burden-
some” or “a subterfuge for discriminating based on a health status 
factor.”70  Despite this appropriately cautionary language, it 
should be relatively easy to justify programs aimed at behaviors 
that are generally believed to increase the risk of chronic diseases 
in large populations.  Second, the reward opportunity must be of-
fered annually, which is a very simple condition to meet.71  
Third, the reward opportunity must be available to all similarly 
situated individuals, which generally means everyone in the in-
surance pool or worksite, which is a seemingly simple require-
ment.72  However, a reward is not considered to be available to all 
if some individuals cannot meet the reward requirements, such as 
lowered cholesterol or weight loss.73  To retain the exempt status of 
the program, it must offer an alternative standard to be met by 
individuals who find it “unreasonably difficult due to a medical 
condition” to meet the regular standard or for whom it would be 
“medically inadvisable to attempt to satisfy”74 the regular stan-
dard.  This appears to be a solicitous addition.  However, the pro-
vision notes that the plan “may seek verification [of the medical 
difficulties] from an individual’s physician.”75  The 2006 regula-
tions, which appear to serve as the template for these statutory 
sections, offer examples of “alternative standards” in such cases, 
which include following the advice of the individual’s physician, 
such as taking medication and getting blood tests.76  Thus, it 
would be permissible for a plan to require a person to follow a 
physician’s recommendations in order to qualify for any reward. 
  
 67. HA T. TU & RALPH C. MAYRELL, EMPLOYER WELLNESS INITIATIVES GROW, BUT 
EFFECTIVENESS VARIES WIDELY 2 (2010), available at http://www.nihcr.org/Employer-
Wellness-Programs.pdf.  
 68. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)(3). 
 69. Id. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(B). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(C). 
 72. Id. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(D). 
 73. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(D)(i). 
 74. Id. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(D)(i)(I), (II). 
 75. Id. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(D)(ii). 
 76. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.702(f)(3)(ex. 3), (ex. 4). 
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The fourth requirement limits the amount of any reward to 30% 
of an individual’s total premium, including both the employer and 
employee contributions.77  This represents an increase from the 
20% limit in the 2006 regulations.78  The reward can be in the form 
of a premium discount, a waiver of cost-sharing, or the absence of 
a surcharge.79  In other words, the reward can function as a pen-
alty for those who do not receive it.80  In 2010, the average annual 
premium for employer-sponsored group health insurance for indi-
vidual coverage was $5,049,81 which could allow an additional 
payment of $1,515 for non-participants or unsuccessful partici-
pants.  If the employee’s family is eligible to participate in a well-
ness program, the additional payment could apply to the price of 
family coverage, which averaged $13,770 in 2010.  Premiums for 
independently purchased health insurance, such as policies pur-
chased through a future health insurance exchange, generally are 
higher than employer-sponsored plan premiums, so that wellness 
program rewards and penalty payments under such policies could 
be correspondingly larger.  Moreover, the ACA authorizes the Sec-
retaries of Labor, Health and Human Services, and the Treasury 
to increase the maximum additional payments to 50% of the total 
cost of premiums “if the Secretaries determine that such an in-
crease is appropriate.”82  If the Secretaries base their determina-
tion on the somewhat optimistic literature on wellness programs, 
an increase is likely.83  
Health insurers and group health plans are to report annually 
to the Secretary on the results of wellness programs, as well as 
other quality measures, such as medication and care compliance 
initiatives, and activities to prevent hospital readmission, improve 
patient safety, and reduce medical errors.84  The wellness pro-
grams are permitted to include smoking cessation, weight man-
agement, physical fitness, nutrition, health disease prevention, 
  
 77. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(A). 
 78. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.702(f)(3)(ex. 1)(ii); 42 C.F.R. §54.9802-1(f) (2011); 45 C.F.R. § 
146.121(f)(3)(ex. 1)(ii) (2011). 
 79. 42 U.S.C. § 300-4(j)(3)(A). 
 80. See 45 C.F.R. § 146.121(f)(3)(ex. 2)(i), (ex. 5)(i)-(ii). 
 81. Gary Claxton et al., Health Benefits in 2010:  Premiums Rise Modestly, Workers Pay 
More Toward Coverage, 29 HEALTH AFFS. 1942, 1943 (2010). 
 82. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(A). 
 83. See infra Part IV. 
 84. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-17 (2010).  For a discussion of the patient safety provisions, see 
generally Barry R. Furrow, Regulating Patient Safety:  The Patient Protection and Afford-
able Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1727 (2011). 
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healthy lifestyle support, and diabetes prevention.85  However, 
they are not allowed to collect information about or deny discounts 
on the basis of lawful possession of firearms.86 
The ACA also authorizes federal grants to state Medicaid pro-
grams to “provide incentives to Medicaid beneficiaries who ‘suc-
cessfully participate’ in wellness programs and ‘demonstrate 
changes in health risk and outcome, including the adoption and 
maintenance of healthy behaviors by meeting specific targets.’”87  
The eligible programs are those that succeed in one or more of the 
following:  (1) ceasing use of tobacco; (2) controlling or reducing 
weight; (3) lowering cholesterol; (4) lowering blood pressure; and 
(5) avoiding the onset of diabetes or, in the case of a diabetic, im-
proving the management of that condition.88  States are required 
to track and validate beneficiary progress, as well as evaluate the 
program’s effectiveness.89  What counts as a permissible incentive 
is not specified in the Act.  If the programs must “validate” benefi-
ciary progress, however, states may try to use more coercive in-
centives than would be permitted in private health plans.90  
The ACA encourages experimentation with wellness programs 
in other ways.91  The Departments of Health and Human Services, 
Treasury, and Labor are to create demonstration projects for ten 
states to have health insurers implement wellness programs that 
comply with the above ACA requirements.92  The programs are not 
to decrease insurance coverage or trigger additional federal tax 
credits or subsidies for people to obtain health coverage.93  The 
Secretaries are to report to Congress on whether such programs 
are effective in “promoting health and preventing disease,” their 
impact on “access to care and affordability of coverage,” their ef-
  
 85. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-17(b). 
 86. Id. § 300gg-17(c). 
 87. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 4108(a)(1)(i), (ii), 
124 Stat. 119, 561 (2010). 
 88. Id. § 4108(a)(3)(A)(i)-(v), 124 Stat. at 561. 
 89. Id. § 4108(c)(1), 124 Stat. at 562.  
 90. Prior to the ACA’s enactment, several states (Florida, Idaho, Kentucky, West Vir-
ginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming) obtained Medicaid waivers to begin wellness programs.  See 
JESSICA GREENE, MEDICAID EFFORTS TO INCENTIVIZE HEALTHY BEHAVIORS 8-9 (2007), avail-
able at http://www.chcs.org/usr_doc/Medicaid_Efforts_to_Incentivize_Healthy_Behaviors.pdf. 
 91. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 4206, 124 Stat. at 576 (demonstration 
project concerning individualized wellness plan); § 4303, 124 Stat. at 582 (codified at 280l 
to -3) (CDC and employer-based wellness programs).  See Howard K. Koh & Kathleen G. 
Sebelius, Promoting Prevention Through the Affordable Care Act, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
1296 (2010). 
 92. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(l) (2010). 
 93. 26 U.S.C. § 36B (2010) (tax credits); 42 U.S.C. § 18071 (subsidies). 
File: 271 Mariner Article REVISED_R2.doc Created on:  4/11/2012 11:17:00 AM Last Printed: 4/11/2012 11:38:00 AM 
288 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 50 
 
fect on “changing behavior,” and the “effectiveness of different 
types of rewards.”94  The requirement to analyze the effects of 
wellness programs is welcome.  However, one might ask what 
would happen if the analysis found either that major health im-
provements substantially increased costs or that significant cost 
savings failed to noticeably prevent disease. 
Because large employers are more likely to be able to offer both 
health insurance and wellness programs, the Act provides grants 
for small employers to provide wellness programs95 and funds the 
CDC to allow it to provide technical assistance.96  Group health 
plan premiums are community rated, so that all members of the 
group pay the same amount, regardless of their individual health 
risks.  Although the ACA limits and smooths insurance premium 
rates for qualified plans offered in health insurance exchanges,97 it 
permits higher premium rates to account for geographic area, age, 
and smoking.98  Rates for tobacco use cannot be more than 1.5 
times the standard premium.99  In effect, however, the use of well-
ness programs could create a special rate band of between 130 and 
150% of the group rate for persons who fail to participate in well-
ness programs or meet health standards.100  For persons who fail 
to stop using tobacco products, a wellness program penalty, to-
gether with a permitted rate differential, could increase their 
health insurance premiums to 180% of the group premium (200% 
if the wellness program penalty is increased to 50% in the future).   
Thus, a $5,000 annual premium could rise as high as $9,000.  
The emphasis on health promotion is evident throughout the 
Act.  The Act creates a National Prevention, Health Promotion, 
and Public Health Council, chaired by the Surgeon General, with-
in the Department of Health and Human Services, to make “rec-
ommendations to the President and Congress concerning the most 
pressing health issues confronting the United States and changes 
in Federal policy to achieve national wellness, health promotion, 
  
 94. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(m). 
 95. Id. § 280l-1 (note). 
 96. Id. § 280l. 
 97. The Act imposes minimum medical loss ratios, 42 U.S.C. § 18051(b)(3), risk corri-
dors, id. § 18062, allows risk adjustments, id. § 18063, and requires reinsurance for “high-
risk” enrollees in individual plans offered in health insurance exchanges, id. § 18061. Be-
tween 50 and 100 “high-risk” conditions or diagnoses are to be identified.  Id. 
 98. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg(a)(1). Rates for older adults cannot be more than three times the 
standard premium.  Id.  Rate can also vary for individual versus family coverage.  Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See text accompanying notes 76-81. 
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and public health goals, including the reduction of tobacco use, 
sedentary behavior, and poor nutrition.”101 The Council issued its 
first “National Prevention and Health Promotion Strategy” on 
June 22, 2011.102  This report properly recognizes the effects of so-
cial determinants on health:   
Many of the strongest predictors of health and well-being fall 
outside of the health care setting.  Social, economic, and envi-
ronmental factors all influence health.  People with a quality 
education, stable employment, safe homes and neighborhoods, 
and access to high quality preventive services tend to be 
healthier throughout their lives and live longer.103   
Although the Report encourages social and environmental im-
provements, it does not recommend specific programs, beyond ed-
ucation, to carry them out.104  Structural changes in agricultural 
policy, roadways, transportation, and the built environment would 
require new legislation, which would require substantial financial 
resources and could face political opposition.105  
The Report’s most specific recommendations—its seven priori-
ties—focus on personal behaviors:  tobacco free living; preventing 
drug abuse and excessive alcohol use; healthy eating; active living; 
injury and violence free living; reproductive and sexual health; 
and mental and emotional well-being.106  In particular, it encour-
ages payers, including public health benefit programs and com-
mercial health insurers, as well as employers, to provide wellness 
programs.107  
No matter how understandable the focus on personal behaviors 
is, it may miss an opportunity to significantly reduce the personal 
burden of chronic disease in the country.  The reasons for the high 
cost of chronic care are multifaceted.  People with chronic diseases 
typically need ongoing treatment, but many have no consistent 
  
 101. Id. § 300u-10. 
 102. NAT’L PREVENTION COUNCIL, NATIONAL PREVENTION STRATEGY:  AMERICA’S PLAN 
FOR BETTER HEALTH AND WELLNESS (2011), available at http://www.healthcare.gov/ 
prevention/nphpphc/strategy/report.pdf.  
 103. Id. at 6.  It also notes the importance of threats to health from what it calls “com-
munity stressors (e.g., job and home losses, discrimination, family separations, and vio-
lence).”  Id. at 11. 
 104. Id. 
 105. See Fazal Khan, Combating Obesity through the Built Environment:  Is There a 
Clear Path to Success?, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 387 (2011). 
 106. NAT’L PREVENTION COUNCIL, supra note 102, at 7. 
 107. Id. 
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source of care.108  Others may have no health insurance or may 
move in and out of health plans and Medicaid.109  Interruptions in 
care may exacerbate illnesses, leading to more intensive and ex-
pensive acute care.  The ACA takes steps to make more consistent 
access to care possible by requiring health insurance to be avail-
able regardless of health status and by providing subsidies or en-
rollment in Medicaid for those unable to afford private insur-
ance.110  It also provides financial incentives for providers to create 
accountable care organizations to coordinate care.111  However, it 
retains the existing patchwork of public and private health plans, 
leaving patients, including those with chronic illnesses, vulnerable 
to shifting in and out of different plans with different providers.  
Thus, the most specific efforts to reduce the cost of chronic illness 
fall on the individuals themselves, especially through wellness 
programs, which do not require major economic or institutional 
upheavals.112   
IV.  CHRONIC DISEASE:  PREVENTION, COSTS, 
AND WELLNESS PROGRAMS 
A. Chronic Disease:  Prevalence and Causes 
Given the general concern about the cost of chronic diseases and 
the ACA’s encouragement of changing personal behaviors that 
increase the risk of such diseases, it seems important to know 
whether policies like wellness programs can either improve health 
or control costs.  First, there is good reason to focus policy recom-
mendations on reducing the disability and discomfort caused by 
  
 108. About 45% of people with public insurance have at least two chronic conditions, 
compared with one-third of people with private insurance and 16% of uninsured persons.  
STEVEN MACHLIN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MEDICAL EXPENDITURE 
PANEL SURVEY:  STATISTICAL BRIEF # 320:  HEALTH CARE ACCESS AND EXPENDITURES 
AMONG NON-ELDERLY ADULTS WITH MULTIPLE CHRONIC CONDITIONS:  VARIATIONS BY 
INSURANCE COVERAGE STATUS, 2007-2008 (AVERAGE ANNUAL) 1-2 (2011), available at 
http://meps.ahrq.gov/mepsweb/data_files/publications/st320/stat320.pdf.  More than 25% of 
these uninsured had no usual source of care, compared with 12.1% of those with public 
insurance and 8.7% of those with private insurance.  Id. 
 109. Benjamin D. Sommers & Sara Rosenbaum, Issues in Health Reform:  How Changes 
in Eligibility May Move Millions Back and Forth Between Medicaid and Insurance Ex-
changes, 30 HEALTH AFFS. 228, 232-36 (2011). 
 110. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act §§ 1411-1415 (subsidies and tax cred-
its); §§ 2001-2001 (expanded eligibility for Medicaid). 
 111. See supra note 6. 
 112. Starr, supra note 3, at 261 (concluding that the ACA’s wellness provision “seeks 
to raise the cost of unhealthy practices”). 
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chronic diseases.113  More than half of all deaths in the United 
States (54%) in 2007 were attributable to heart disease, cancers, 
and stroke (53% in 2009).114  Final data on the top ten causes of 
death in 2007 are shown in Table 1.115  
TABLE 1:  LEADING CAUSES OF DEATH, FINAL DATA FOR 2007 
Cause of Death Number % of Total Deaths 
All causes 2,423,712     100.0 
Diseases of heart 616,067 25.4  
Malignant neoplasms 
  [cancers] 
562,875 23.2 
Cerebrovascular diseases 
  [stroke] 
135,952 5.6 
Chronic lower respiratory 





Alzheimer’s disease 74,632 3.1 
Diabetes mellitus 71,382 2.9 
Influenza and pneumonia 52,717 2.2 
Nephritis, nephritic syndrome
  and nephrosis 
46,448 1.9 
Septicemia 34,828 1.4 
 
Second, there is considerable evidence that certain behavioral 
factors increase the risk of chronic disease.116  Like most observers, 
  
 113. P’SHIP FOR SOLUTIONS, CHRONIC CONDITIONS:  MAKING THE CASE FOR ONGOING 
CARE 24 (Gerard Anderson et al. eds., John Hopkins Univ., 2004) (2002), available at 
http://www.partnershipforsolutions.org/DMS/files/chronicbook2004.pdf.  
 114. Melonie Heron, Deaths:  Leading Causes for 2007, 59 NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP. 1, 9 
tbl.C (2011), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr59/nvsr59_08.pdf.  For a 
history and explanation of the classification of causes of death, see IWAO M. MORIYAMA ET 
AL., HISTORY OF THE STATISTICAL CLASSIFICATION OF DISEASES AND CAUSES OF DEATH 
(Harry M. Rosenberg & Donna L. Hoyert eds. 2011), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/ 
data/misc/classification_diseases2011.pdf. 
 115. Heron, supra note 114.  Preliminary data for 2009 show similar results, except that 
suicide overtook septicemia as the tenth leading cause.  Kenneth D. Kochanek et al., supra 
note 8, at 5 tbl.B.  
 116. See supra notes 9-10; CTRS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION & THE MERCK 
CO. FOUND., THE STATE OF AGING AND HEALTH IN AMERICA (2007), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/Aging/pdf/saha_2007.pdf. 
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WHO lists physical inactivity, poor diet, smoking, and harmful 
alcohol use as the key behavioral risk factors for chronic dis-
eases.117  Somewhat paradoxically, the prevalence of several key 
risk factors for heart disease—high cholesterol, high blood pres-
sure, and tobacco use—has declined among people in all weight 
categories since 1960, the same period in which chronic disease 
prevalence rose.118  A substantial body of research  demonstrates 
that the social determinants of health, including income, educa-
tion, employment, housing, genetics, the environment, and even 
political inequality, contribute significantly to the development of 
chronic diseases.119  Given the multiplicity of factors contributing 
to non-infectious diseases, it is difficult to tease out exactly how 
much is attributable to behavior, as distinct from social determi-
nants like genetics or unemployment, for example.  The structural 
factors, of course, are more resistant to change.  Thus, it is not 
surprising that those seeking more immediate results focus on 
individual behavior. 
Reports about the separate links between chronic disease, on 
one hand, and behavioral risks, treatment costs, or premature 
  
 117. WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 9, at vii. 
 118. Edward W. Gregg et al., Secular Trends in Cardiovascular Disease Risk Factors 
According to Body Mass in U.S. Adults, 293 JAMA 1868, 1874 (2005) (also finding that 
diabetes increased). 
 119. See, e.g., David A. Alter et al., Lessons from Canada’s Universal Health Care:  So-
cially Disadvantaged Patients Use More Health Services, Still Have Poorer Health, 30 
HEALTH AFFs. 274 (2011); Jason Beckfield & Nancy Krieger, Epi+Demos+Cracy:  Linking 
Political Systems and Priorities to the Magnitude of Health Inequalities—Evidence, Gaps, 
and a Research Agenda, 31 EPIDEMIOLOGY REV. 152 (2009) (countries with social safety 
nets tend to have fewer inequalities and fewer health disparities); Sandro Galea et al., 
Estimated Deaths Attributable to Social Factors in the United States, 101 AM. J. PUB. 
HEALTH 1456 (2011); M. David Low et al., Can Education Policy Be Health Policy?  Impli-
cations of Research on the Social Determinants of Health, 30 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 
1131 (2005); Jo C. Phelan et al., Social Conditions as Fundamental Causes of Health Ine-
qualities:  Theory, Evidence and Policy Implications, 51 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. S28 
(2010); David J. Roelfs et al., Losing Life and Livelihood:  A Systematic Review and Meta-
Analysis of Unemployment and All-Cause Mortality, 72 SOC. SCI. & MED. 840 (2011); A. 
Siddiqi, D. Zuberi & Q. C. Nguyen, The Role of Health Insurance in Explaining Immigrant 
Versus Non-immigrant Disparities in Access to Health Care:  Comparing the United States 
to Canada, 69 SOC. SCI. MED. 1452 (2009); Marilyn A. Winkeby et al., Social Class Dispari-
ties in Risk Factors for Disease:  Eight-Year Prevalence Patterns by Level of Education, 19 
PREVENTIVE MED. 1 (1990); INSTIT. OF MED., Unequal Treatment:  Confronting Racial 
and Ethnic Disparities in Health Care (Brian D. Smedley et al., eds., 2003); N. 
WALLERSTEIN, WHAT IS THE EVIDENCE ON EFFECTIVENESS OF EMPOWERMENT TO IMPROVE 
HEALTH? (2006), available at 
http://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0010/74656/E88086.pdf; WORLD HEALTH 
ORG., SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH:  THE SOLID FACTS (Richard Wilkinson & Michael 
Marmot eds., 2d ed. 2003), available at http://www.euro.who.int/__data/ 
assets/pdf_file/0005/98438/e81384.pdf. 
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death, on the other hand, can invite some rhetorical leaps.120  For 
example, in a 2007 report, the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention began its description of behavioral factors that cause 
disease with the heading “More than one-third of U.S. deaths are 
preventable.”121  This is nonsense, of course.  In the long run, no 
one’s death is preventable.  Similarly, a video on the website 
homepage of HealthMedia, Inc., which sells digital coaching pro-
grams, claims “seventy percent of healthcare costs can be pre-
vented through behavior change.”122  Would that it were true.  
About 75% of deaths from chronic diseases worldwide occur among 
those over sixty years of age.123  At least in the developed world, 
people are escaping infectious diseases and accidents and living 
long enough to succumb to heart diseases, stroke, and cancers.  
The most likely general consensus is that we all hope to prevent 
disabling conditions that make life difficult, especially among the 
young.  Therefore, to the extent that disabling conditions can be 
prevented—and, ideally, the years of healthy life increased—
preventive measures are to be greatly desired.  
Whether prevention can reduce the costs of chronic diseases is a 
different question.  Certainly, worry about such costs is wide-
spread.  And, it is logical to believe that a reduction in chronic dis-
ease would also reduce treatment costs.  The National Prevention 
Strategy states that prevention can lower health care costs.124  A 
report for the World Economic Forum estimated that in 2010, 
worldwide direct and indirect costs were $863 billion for cardio-
vascular diseases, $500 billion for diabetes, $458 billion for can-
cers, $2.1 trillion for chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and 
$2.5 trillion for mental illnesses.125  A recent study estimates that 
the total costs of obesity in the U.S. could be as high as $147 bil-
  
 120. For example, an estimate of the number of deaths caused by behavioral factors was 
critiqued and later corrected in part by the authors.  Ali H. Mokdad et al., Actual Causes of 
Death in the United States 2000, 291 JAMA 1238, 1243-45 (2004) (concluding that modifi-
able behavioral risk factors are the leading causes of mortality in the United States); Ali H. 
Mokdad et al., Correction:  Actual Causes of Death in the United States 2000, 293 JAMA 
293, 293 (2005). 
 121. CTRS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION & THE MERCK CO. FOUND., supra 
note 116, at iii.  
 122. HEALTHMEDIA SOLUTIONS, http://healthmedia.com/index.htm#/300 (last visited 
Nov. 16, 2011).  Such claims appear to confuse research attributing between 50% to 70% of 
health care costs in certain populations to chronic disease and separate findings that cer-
tain behaviors are associated with the development of chronic diseases. 
 123. WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 9, at ix. 
 124. NAT’L PREVENTION COUNCIL, supra note 102, at 6. 
 125. BLOOM ET AL., supra note 8. 
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lion.126  The federal government is obviously concerned, because 
Medicare pays an estimated 23% of these costs, while Medicaid 
pays an estimated 19%.127  However, the study that estimated the-
se costs also estimated that, without obesity, costs would only be 
7% to 11% lower.128 
Studies of chronic disease costs require some parsing.  Most 
studies are based on separate estimates of the prevalence of a 
chronic disease like heart disease, risk factors like obesity for 
heart disease, and the costs of services for diseases for which obe-
sity is a risk factor.   Actual data on the costs of care for illnesses 
that are caused by obesity alone are hard to find.  Many research-
ers use the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (“MEPS”), a peri-
odic survey of a representative national sample of the civilian non-
institutionalized population that asks about medical spending, 
health insurance status, health status, and body mass index 
(“BMI”), or the National Expenditures Accounts, which also in-
cludes institutionalized adults.129  Different studies use different 
time periods (e.g., annual or lifetime), different populations (e.g., 
elderly, non-elderly, or children), and different types of costs (e.g., 
medical care, all health expenditures, or government expendi-
tures, including disability and pension payments).130  There is gen-
eral agreement that the cost of medical care to treat chronic condi-
tions is increasing, but there are several possible reasons for the 
increase, not all of them easily amenable to prevention.  For ex-
ample, much of the cost has been attributed to the growing pro-
portion of elderly in the population,131 the increased costs of medi-
  
 126. Eric A. Finkelstein et al., Annual Medical Spending Attributable to Obesity:  Pay-
er—and Service—Specific Estimates, 28 HEALTH AFFS. w822, w828-w831 (2009).  See also 
Angela B. Mariotto et al., Projections of the Cost of Cancer Care in the United States:  2010–
2020, 103 J. NAT’L. CANCER INST. 117, 126 (2011); CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 7.  
 127. Justine G. Trogdon et al., State—and Payer—Specific Estimates of Annual Medical 
Expenditures Attributable to Obesity, 20 OBESITY 214 (2011), available at http://www. 
nature.com/oby/journal/vaop/ncurrent/pdf/oby2011169a.pdf.  
 128. Id. at 4. 
 129. The Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, begun in 1996, is described at Survey 
Background, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND QUALITY, http://www.meps. 
ahrq.gov/mepsweb/about_meps/survey_back.jsp (last updated August 21, 2009). 
 130. See, e.g., Katherine M. Flegal et al., Prevalence and Trends in Obesity Among U.S. 
Adults, 1999-2008, 303 JAMA 235 (2010). 
 131. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION & THE MERCK CO. FOUND., supra 
note 116, at 5.  But see Uwe Reinhardt, Does the Aging of the Population Really Drive the 
Demand for Medical Care?, 22 HEALTH AFFS. 27, 34-35 (2003) (noting that in the United 
States, the age distribution does not explain all of the increase in health care costs).  A 
larger population necessarily incurs more costs, but should also produce a larger GDP.  
ROBERT J. BARRO, HEALTH AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (1996), available at www.paho.org/ 
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cal technology and services,132 and the increased incidence of 
chronic disease.133  
It is possible that the costs of chronic diseases have increased in 
part because more people have been diagnosed with a disease than 
in the past, when some individuals might not have recognized a 
problem—hypertension or metabolic syndrome, for example—as 
warranting medical attention.   H. Gilbert Welch and colleagues 
argue that the medical paradigm has shifted from one in which 
patients see physicians when they have symptoms to one in which 
everyone is encouraged to be screened for many possible condi-
tions when they have no symptoms of disease.134  Increasingly, so-
phisticated diagnostic technologies enable physicians to find 
smaller and smaller abnormalities, which may or may not develop 
into symptomatic diseases.135  This increased screening can in-
crease the number of conditions found without necessarily chang-
ing the resulting health outcomes in the long-term.136  Increased 
screening for disease has the advantage of identifying some prob-
lems at an early enough stage to permit curative treatment,137 but 
screening itself has costs, including the costs of the screening 
tests, unnecessary treatment for false positives, and sometimes 
adverse reactions and complications from unnecessary treat-
ment.138  The controversies over mammograms and PSA testing 
are recent examples of the complexity of determining the value of 
screening for diseases.139  Correctly diagnosing diseases brings 
  
ENGLISH/HDP/HDD/barro.pdf (finding that a 5-year increase in life expectancy could 
result in a 0.3-0.5% increase in GDP growth rate). 
 132. SHEILA D. SMITH ET AL., THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE ON HEALTH CARE 
COST SPENDING:  AN EVALUATION OF THE LITERATURE (2000), available at http://www. 
cms.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/tech_2000_0810.pdf. See Melinda J. Beeu-
wkes Buntin et al., Increased Medicare Expenditures for Physicians’ Services:  What Are the 
Causes?, 41 INQUIRY 83 (2004) (noting that new technologies have contributed to rising 
costs). 
 133. See, e.g., Flegal et al., supra note 130; Hoffman et al., supra note 7.  
 134. H. GILBERT WELCH ET AL., OVERDIAGNOSED:  MAKING PEOPLE SICK IN THE PURSUIT 
OF HEALTH xii (2011). 
 135. Id. at 35 
 136. Id. at 44. 
 137. For example, treatment of hypertension can prevent or delay heart disease.  K.L. 
Ong et al., Prevalence, Awareness, Treatment, and Control of Hypertension among United 
States Adults 1999-2004, 49 HYPERTENSION 69, 73-74 (2007). 
 138. WELCH ET AL., supra note 134, at 168-171. 
 139. Id. at x-xi; Gina Kolata, Mammogram Debate Took Group by Surprise, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 20, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/20/health/20prevent.html?_r=1&emc=eta1; 
Allan S. Brett & Richard J. Ablin, Prostate-Cancer Screening—What the U.S. Preventive 
Services Task Force Left Out, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1949 (2011), available at 
http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMp1112191.  
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more patients into treatment, and treatment modalities are often 
more intensive and expensive than those used several decades 
ago.140  Thus, improved screening and treatment brings a mix of 
personal benefits and additional costs.  
Successful preventive or treatment measures are valuable, be-
cause they enable people to live longer, healthier lives.141  That 
should be sufficient reason to encourage their use.  Yet, the justifi-
cation for prevention routinely includes the assumption that pre-
vention saves money.142  Some preventive measures, especially 
immunizations and adults taking low-dose aspirin, appear to save 
money.143  Estimates of the costs of chronic diseases that are at-
tributed to specific risk factors, such as smoking and obesity, can 
be misunderstood to mean that the amount of those costs could be 
saved if those risk factors were eliminated.144  That assumes that 
people without those risk factors would not incur costs for other 
diseases, whereas almost everyone will incur some health care 
costs, if only at the end of life.  If we are lucky, those costs will be 
less for healthy people than for those with chronic illnesses. 
We might not be lucky.  Most studies finding that health care 
costs are higher for those with chronic diseases do not account for 
lifetime costs of care.145  The longer people live, the longer they will 
  
 140. Charles S. Roehrig & David M. Rousseau, The Growth in Cost Per Case Explains 
Far More of US Health Spending Increases Than Rising Disease Prevalence, 30 HEALTH 
AFFS. 167, 169 (2011) (“increases in treated prevalence account for about one-fourth of 
overall growth in real per capita spending, with the remainder attributable to growth in 
cost per case”); Kenneth E. Thorpe & David H. Howard, The Rise in Spending Among Medi-
care Beneficiaries:  The Role of Chronic Disease Prevalence and Changes in Treatment In-
tensity, 25 HEALTH AFFS. w378 (2006) (estimating that about half of the increase in per 
capita spending for Medicare beneficiaries was attributable to increases in per capita 
spending, with about half due to population aging). 
 141. For example, most pediatric immunizations prevent deaths from infectious dis-
eases.  Ctrs for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Ten 
Great Public Health Achievements—United States, 2001-2010, 60 MORBIDITY & 
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 619, 619 (2011), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/ 
preview/mmwrhtml/mm6019a5.htm.  
 142. See, e.g., Jeffrey Levi et al., Healthier Americans for a Healthier Economy, HEALTHY 
AMERICANS ISSUE BRIEF (TRUST FOR AM.’S HEALTH, Washington, D.C.), Oct. 2011, at 1, 
available at http://healthyamericans.org/assets/files/TFAH2011PreventEconomy05.pdf; 
P’SHIP FOR SOLUTIONS, supra note 113. 
 143. Sarah Goodell et al., Cost Savings and Cost-effectiveness of Clinical Preventive Care, 
THE SYNTHESIS PROJECT (ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., Princeton, N.J.), Sept. 2009, at 
1, available at http://www.rwjf.org/files/research/092209.policysynthesis.preventivecare. 
brief.pdf. 
 144. See HEALTHMEDIA SOLUTIONS, supra note 122. 
 145. See, e.g., Nicolaas P. Pronk et al., Relationship Between Modifiable Health Risks 
and Short-term Health Care Charges, 282 JAMA 2235, 2235 (1999) (finding that those who 
were physically active, did not smoke, and were not overweight had almost half (49%) the 
health care costs attributable to non-healthy adults over age forty). 
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continue to get medical care. Thus, the total lifetime costs of care 
for healthy, elderly people are similar to the costs for more seri-
ously ill people who die at a younger age.146  There is even evidence 
that healthy people incur more lifetime health care costs than 
people who are obese or who use tobacco, because healthy people 
live longer.147  Indeed, the general consensus of economists and 
actuaries is that few preventive measures can reduce lifetime 
costs of health care.148  In 2009, before the ACA was enacted, the 
director of the Congressional Budget Office, Douglas W. Elmen-
dorf, concluded that “[a]lthough different types of preventive care 
have different effects on spending, the evidence suggests that for 
most preventive services, expanded utilization leads to higher, not 
lower, medical spending overall.”149 
Assumptions about the costs of chronic diseases also depend up-
on who is paying.  The federal government’s budget must include 
the costs of Social Security, Medicare, and the Department of Vet-
erans Affairs, as well as increased Medicaid expenditures for a 
newly expanded eligible population, so it must plan for the future 
population of elderly and disabled.150  Medicaid and the State 
Children’s Health Insurance Program covered forty-five million 
  
 146. See, e.g., James Lubitz et al., Health, Life Expectancy, and Health Care Spending 
Among the Elderly, 349 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1048 (2003) (finding that Medicare beneficiaries’ 
health status has little or no effect on total Medicare costs). 
 147. Pieter H.M. van Baal et al., Lifetime Medical Costs of Obesity:  Prevention No Cure 
for Increasing Health Expenditure, 5 PLOS MED. 0242, 0242 (2008); Kenneth E. Warner, 
The Economics of Tobacco:  Myths and Realities, 9 TOBACCO CONTROL 78, 81 (2000).  See 
also June Stevens et al., The Effect of Age on the Association Between Body-Mass Index and 
Mortality, 338 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1 (1998) (finding that treatment costs were lower for 
smokers than for the obese). 
 148. COST-EFFECTIVENESS IN HEALTH AND MEDICINE 10 (Marthe R. Gold et al. eds., 
1996); Joshua T. Cohen et al., Does Preventive Care Save Money? Health Economics and the 
Presidential Candidates, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 661 (2008); Matthew G. Marin & Jessica 
Nutik Zitter, Expenditures Associated with Preventive Healthcare, 39 PREVENTIVE MED. 856 
(2004); Louise B. Russell, Preventing Chronic Disease:  An Important Investment, but Don’t 
Count on Cost Savings, 28 HEALTH AFFS. 42, 42 (2009).  See also Patrick McGeehan, U.S. 
Rejects Mayor’s Plan to Ban Use of Food Stamps to Buy Soda, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/20/nyregion/ban-on-using-food-stamps-to-buy-soda-
rejected-by-usda.html (noting that the United States Department of Agriculture concluded 
that prohibiting the use of food stamps to buy soda, as requested by New York City Mayor 
Bloomberg, would not necessarily reduce obesity or improve health). 
 149. Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Dir., Cong. Budget Office, to Nathan Deal, 
Ranking Member of the Subcomm. on Health of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce of the 
U.S. House of Representatives (Aug. 7, 2009) (on file with the Cong. Budget Office), avail-
able at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/104xx/doc10492/08-07-Prevention.pdf. 
 150. See Nicole Huberfield, Federalizing Medicaid, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. (forthcoming 
2011) (describing the ACA’s expansion of Medicaid); Gina Livermore et al., Health Care 
Costs Are a Key Driver of Growth in Federal and State Assistance to Working-Age People 
with Disabilities, 30 HEALTH AFFS. 1664, 1664 (2011). 
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people (16.9% of the nonelderly population) in 2010.151  However, 
employers are primarily concerned with their workforce before 
retirement.152  Preventive measures may indeed delay some seri-
ous illnesses and expensive medical care until the population is 
elderly.  
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid are well aware of the 
need to control the costs of caring for their growing populations.  
In 2005, Medicare began pilot testing its Health Support Program, 
in which eight care management companies received $2,000 per 
patient to improve health behaviors and outcomes in Medicare 
beneficiaries with heart disease or diabetes.153  The companies 
were expected to save their fees, plus 5% of patient costs.154  How-
ever, the program was stopped after three years, when Medicare 
costs per patient increased by 5% to 11%, and most companies 
were unable to save even their own fees.155  Recent research sug-
gests that highly intensive and tightly coordinated care for pa-
tients who are elderly or have chronic diseases can improve both 
the quality of care and patient outcomes.156  Whether they can save 
money remains to be seen. 
B. Employee Wellness Programs 
Most polls show that employers remain worried about rising 
health insurance costs and continue to try to contain costs by rais-
  
 151. Paul Fronstin, Sources of Health Insurance and Characteristics of the Uninsured:  
Analysis of the March 2011 Current Population Survey, EBRI ISSUE BRIEF (Emp. Benefit 
Research Inst., Washington, D.C.), Sept. 2011, at 1, available at 
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_09-2011_No362_Uninsured1.pdf (reporting that 
public health benefit programs, including Medicare, which covers certain disabled noneld-
erly, covered 21.6% of the total nonelderly population). 
 152. EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST. & MATHEW GREENWALD & ASSOCS., INC., 2011 RCS 
FACT SHEET #5:  CHANGING EXPECTATIONS ABOUT RETIREMENT 4 (2011), available at 
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/surveys/rcs/2011/FS5_RCS11_Expects_FINAL1.pdf (noting that a 
declining proportion of employers offer health benefits). 
 153. Ctrs. for Medicare and Medicaid Servs., Overview, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/ccip/ (last updated Nov. 29, 2011) (noting that 14% of Medi-
care beneficiaries have heart disease, but account for 43% of spending, and that 18% have 
diabetes and account for 32% of spending). 
 154. NANCY MCCALL ET AL., EVALUATION OF PHASE I OF THE MEDICARE HEALTH SUPPORT 
PILOT PROGRAM UNDER TRADITIONAL FEE-FOR-SERVICE MEDICARE:  18-MONTH INTERIM 
ANALYSIS, REPORT TO CONGRESS, 6, 14 (2008), https://www.cms.gov/reports/downloads/ 
MHS_Second_Report_to_Congress_October_2008.pdf.  The 5% savings requirement was 
removed in 2007.  Id. at 69. 
 155. Id. at 77-78.  
 156. See Chad Boult et al., The Effect of Guided Care Teams on the Use of Health Ser-
vices:  Results from a Cluster-Randomized Controlled Trial, 171 ARCH INTERN MED. 460 
(2011). 
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ing deductibles, increasing paycheck contributions, and moving 
employees to lower-cost health plans.157  Disease management or 
wellness programs are an increasingly popular addition to em-
ployer cost control methods.158  Indeed, there is an entire industry 
devoted to designing and administering such programs, either as 
part of a health insurance plan or as a separate program.159  Safe-
way became the poster child for using wellness programs to save 
health insurance costs.160  The ACA amendment to the HIPAA 
provision governing wellness programs, discussed above, was 
commonly called the Safeway Amendment.161  However, Safeway’s 
cost controls were not necessarily attributable to its Healthy 
Measures wellness program, which enrolled less than 9% of its 
employees.162  Safeway’s savings occurred following a 2006 plan 
change that increased the employee’s share of premium costs from 
20% to 55%.163 
A majority of large employers appear to welcome wellness pro-
grams.164  Small employers are less likely to offer wellness pro-
  
 157. Elizabeth Pendo, Working Sick:  Lessons of Chronic Illness for Health Care Reform, 
9 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 453, 457-59. (2009).  See also Deborah Brunswick, 
Health Insurance Costs to Rise Again Next Year, CNN MONEY, Sept. 22, 2011, 
http://money.cnn.com/2011/09/22/pf/health_insurance_costs/ (noting that premiums are 
expected to rise 5.4%, which is less than recent increases, but still more than the 3.9% 
general inflation rate/consumer price index); ROBIN A. COHEN & MICHAEL E. MARTINEZ, 
NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 
HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE:  EARLY RELEASE OF ESTIMATES FROM THE NATIONAL 
HEALTH INTERVIEW SURVEY, JANUARY-MARCH 2011 (2011), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/ 
data/nhis/earlyrelease/insur201109.pdf.  Employers’ growing use of high-deductible, con-
sumer-directed health plans may or may not affect employees’ use of preventive care.  John 
W. Rowe et al., The Effect of Consumer-Directed Health Plans on the Use of Preventive and 
Chronic Illness Services, 27 HEALTH AFFS. 113 (2008). 
 158. Seff v. Broward Cnty, 778 F. Supp. 2d 1370, 1375 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (“It is the eco-
nomic loss suffered by employers that spurs the development of these programs, not some 
beneficent wish for its employees to be healthy.”). 
 159. See generally CARE CONTINUUM ALLIANCE, http://www.carecontinuum.org/index.asp 
(formerly named the Disease Management Association of America). 
 160. Steven A. Burd, How Safeway is Cutting Health-Care Costs, WALL ST. J., June 12, 
2009, at A15. See JOHN E. MCDONOUGH, INSIDE NATIONAL HEALTH REFORM 192 (2011) 
(reporting that Safeway’s president, Steven Burd, “convinced Democrat and Republican 
members alike that he had found a personal-responsibility path to controlling health care 
costs”). 
 161. David S. Hilzenrath, Misleading Claims about Safeway Wellness Incentives Shape 
Health-Care Bill, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 2010, at G01. 
 162. Id.  See MCDONOUGH, supra note 160, at 193 (Congressional Budget Office staff 
concluded that “Safeway is largely a myth”).  
 163. Id. 
 164. Michelle M. Mello & Meredith B. Rosenthal, Wellness Programs and Lifestyle Dis-
crimination—The Legal Limits, 359 NEW ENG. J. MED. 192, 192 (2008); NAT’L BUS. GRP. 
ON HEALTH & TOWERS WATSON, THE ROAD AHEAD:  SHAPING HEALTH CARE STRATEGY IN A 
POST-REFORM ENVIRONMENT 15 (2011), http://www.towerswatson.com/assets/pdf/3946/ 
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grams, perhaps because they cannot afford the initial investment 
required to purchase a gym or the services of an independent dis-
ease management company.165  Employers promote such programs 
as evidence of their concern for the health of their employees; 
however, many employers focus primarily on the hope that well-
ness programs can reduce the costs of health insurance, decrease 
absenteeism, and improve employee productivity.166  Indeed, most 
disease management companies market their programs to em-
ployers by promising positive returns on the investment.   Wheth-
er employers can reap the financial rewards of a successful well-
ness program depends upon how long it takes for a change in be-
havior to improve health, reduce costs, and decrease employee 
turnover.  Changes that produce relatively immediate effects, such 
as feeling better after smoking cessation, can improve productivity 
within a relatively short time.  However, programs that target 
risks for chronic diseases, such as blood sugar levels and obesity, 
may not have significant effects for many years.  In this era of fre-
quent job changes, an employer may invest a great deal in em-
ployees who save money for a future employer.  Moreover, since 
the majority of healthcare costs are attributable to chronic dis-
eases among the elderly and in the last year of life, it will be Medi-
care, not the employer, who is most likely to save healthcare costs.  
However, a healthy employee who lives a very long life and re-
ceives Social Security benefits may cost the federal government 
more in pensions than it saves in Medicare costs.167 
Employers appear to be more enthusiastic about health promo-
tion than employees.  Some employees may welcome wellness pro-
grams and workplace incentives as a source of motivation, espe-
cially one that does not involve nagging family members.168  Others 
may support wellness programs for fear that rising health care 
  
TowersWatson-NBGH-2011-NA-2010-18560.pdf; KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH 
RESEARCH & EDUCATIONAL TRUST, EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS:  2011 ANNUAL SURVEY 
168 (2011), available at http://ehbs.kff.org/pdf/2011/8225.pdf. Small employers also are less 
likely than large employers to offer health plans.  Id. at 34. 
 165. Tu & Mayrell, supra note 67, at 2. 
 166. Id.  See KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH & EDUCATIONAL TRUST, supra 
note 164 (reporting that the majority of employers surveyed who offer wellness programs 
said their goal is “to improve the health of employees and reduce absenteeism”).  At the 
same time, 26% of all employers surveyed identified disease management as a “very effec-
tive” strategy to control costs.  Id. at 194. 
 167. Timothy Westmoreland, Can We Get There from Here? Universal Health Insurance 
and the Congressional Budget Process, 96 GEO. L.J. 523, 529 (2008). 
 168. See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE:  IMPROVING DECISIONS 
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008). 
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costs attributable to unhealthy employees may reduce overall 
compensation.  Some employees, however, may find the programs 
intrusive or fear losing their job if they fail to meet expectations.  
A Wellpoint report states that almost 75% of employers offered 
their employees a wellness program in 2008.169  But not all em-
ployees, typically less than half, accepted the offer.170  One study of 
a reasonably successful employer program found that, of those 
employees identified as at risk or eligible for a wellness program, 
78% were successfully contacted by telephone.171  Of those con-
tacted, 48% agreed to participate in the program, but less than 
half (45%) of those who began the program stayed for at least six 
months—17% of the original target population.172  IncentOne, a 
company that sells health promotion and disease management 
programs to health insurers and employers, claims that participa-
tion rates may be only 10-15% when incentives are not offered.173  
Its website advocates using incentives to get employees into pro-
grams, stating that “84% of CEOs see incentives as [the] most im-
portant tool.”174   
Incentives may indeed make a difference, both in participation 
rates and outcomes, at least in the short run.175  Economists and 
psychologists have long argued that people respond to financial 
incentives.176  New York City is among several jurisdictions that 
  
 169. Helping People Help Themselves:  Driving Participation in Health Improvement 
Programs, INST. OF HEALTH CARE KNOWLEDGE—RESEARCH SUMMARY (WELLPOINT INST. OF 
HEALTH CARE KNOWLEDGE), Aug. 2009, at 1, available at http://www.wellpoint.com/ 
prodcontrib/groups/wellpoint/@wp_news_research/documents/wlp_assets/pw_d014924.pdf. 
 170. Id. at 2. 
 171. Wendy D. Lynch et al., Documenting Participation in an Employer-Sponsored Dis-
ease Management Program:  Selection, Exclusion, Attrition, and Active Engagement as 
Possible Metrics, 48 J. OCCUPATIONAL ENVTL. MED. 447, 450 (2006).  The number of em-
ployees deemed to be at risk was not specified.  Id. 
 172. Id. at 452. 
 173. The Science of Health Incentives, INCENTONE (Nov. 2009), http://www.incentone. 
com/index.php?option=com_smartformer&Itemid=173. 
 174. The Value of Health Incentives, INCENTONE, http://www.incentone.com/index. 
php?option=com_content&view=article&id=72&Itemid=74 (last visited Feb. 17, 2012). 
 175. See Kate Cahill & Rafael Perera, Competitions and Incentives for Smoking Cessa-
tion, COCHRANE DATABASE OF SYSTEMATIC REVIEWS (Cochrane Collaboration, London, 
England), Apr. 13, 2011, at 1, 2; Leslie K. John et al., Financial Incentives for Extended 
Weight Loss:  A Randomized Controlled Trial, 26 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 621, 625 (2011); 
Kim Sutherland et al., Impact of Targeted Financial Incentives on Personal Health Behav-
ior:  A Review of the Literature, 65 MED. CARE RESEARCH & REV. 36S, 38S-39S (2008). 
 176. See, e.g., George Loewenstein et al., Asymmetric Paternalism to Improve Health 
Behaviors, 298 JAMA 1425 (2007) (encouraging use of incentives to encourage people to 
engage in beneficial behaviors, while acknowledging that this will be controversial); John 
Cawley & Christopher J. Ruhm, The Economics of Risky Health Behaviors 100-103 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17081, 2011). 
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have paid people to get medical examinations or tests.177  A reward 
of $750 increased smoking cessation for a year in one randomized, 
controlled trial.178  Florida introduced a program to reward Medi-
caid recipients for engaging in certain healthy behaviors with 
vouchers to purchase medical products not covered by Medicaid at 
retail pharmacies, but participation in the program is still low.179  
In contrast, Arizona Governor Jan Brewer’s proposal to charge a 
fifty dollar fee to Medicaid beneficiaries, including those who 
smoke or are obese, provoked controversy, perhaps because it did 
not offer beneficiaries any new assistance or other benefit in re-
turn for the fee.180 
Simply providing insurance coverage for additional benefits can 
operate as an incentive to get preventive care, by removing the 
need to pay out of pocket.   This is undoubtedly the motivation 
behind state and ACA requirements for insurers to cover preven-
tive services.  It is also consistent with research findings that an 
important reason that people fail to seek medical care is the cost 
of that care.181  Medicare Part D appears to have increased recom-
mended prescription drug use among Medicare beneficiaries.182  
Cost-sharing, such as high co-payments or deductibles, can dis-
  
 177. JAMES RICCIO ET AL., TOWARD REDUCED POVERTY ACROSS GENERATIONS:  EARLY 
FINDINGS FROM NEW YORK CITY’S CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFER PROGRAM iii (2010), avail-
able at http://www.mdrc.org/publications/549/full.pdf.  Mexico has tried similar programs.  
Id. at xv.   
 178. Kevin G. Volpp et al., A Randomized, Controlled Trial of Financial Incentives for 
Smoking Cessation, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 699, 708 (2009). 
 179. GREENE, supra note 90, at 8-9. 
 180. Janet Adamy, Arizona Proposes Medicaid Fat Fee, WALL ST. J., Apr. 1, 2011, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704530204576235151262336300.html 
(noting that 25.5% of Arizona residents were obese and that its Medicaid program needed 
additional revenue). 
 181. See Lisa Dubay et al., The Uninsured and the Affordability of Health Insurance 
Coverage, 26 HEALTH AFFS. w22, w23 (2007); MAMANTHA PANCHOLI, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH 
& HUMAN SERVS., MEDICAL EXPENDITURE PANEL SURVEY:  STATISTICAL BRIEF #32:  
REASONS FOR LACKING A USUAL SOURCE OF CARE:  2001 ESTIMATES FOR THE U.S. CIVILIAN 
NONINSTITUTIONALIZED POPULATION (2004), available at http://www.meps.ahrq.gov/ 
mepsweb/data_files/publications/st32/stat32.pdf; ROBIN M. WEINICK ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MEDICAL EXPENDITURE PANEL SURVEY:  RESEARCH FINDINGS #3:  
ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE—SOURCES AND BARRIERS, 1996 4 (1997), available at 
http://meps.ahrq.gov/mepsweb/data_files/publications/rf3/rf3.shtml.  See generally SUSAN 
S. SERED & RUSHIKA FERNANDOPULLE, UNINSURED IN AMERICA:  LIFE AND DEATH IN 
THE LAND OF OPPORTUNITY (2005). 
 182. See James J. Kennedy et al., Cost-Related Nonadherence in the Medicare Program:  
The Impact of Part D, 49 MED. CARE 522, 522 (2011).  Prescription drug coverage was add-
ed to the Medical program as Part D of Title XVIII of the Social Security Act, effective in 
2006.  42 U.S.C. §§ 1860D-1 to 1860D-31 (2006). 
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courage even those with health insurance from getting care.183  A 
recent study of the addition of co-payments for cancer drugs for 
Georgia’s Medicaid beneficiaries found that the Georgians reduced 
their acquisition of prescription drugs, compared with two states 
that did not impose co-payments.184  Emergency room visits for 
Georgia Medicaid patients also increased.185  After six months, the 
Georgia Medicaid population cost $2,000 more per patient than 
those in the other two states.186 
Eliminating cost-sharing for preventive services, as the ACA 
does, also has increased the use of preventive care.187  People with 
chronic diseases are more likely to delay or avoid care when their 
insurance requires point-of-service costs like deductibles and co-
pays.188  This strongly suggests that eliminating cost-sharing is 
likely to encourage people to obtain preventive services and im-
prove health.  However, increasing cost-sharing or denying dis-
counts to people who do not successfully participate in wellness 
programs may discourage people from getting services that would 
benefit them.  
Incentives that go beyond removing cost obstacles, like Ari-
zona’s Medicaid proposal, may face resistance.  West Virginia’s 
Medicaid program received a waiver to offer an Enhanced Benefit 
  
 183. See generally Willard G. Manning et al., Health Insurance and the Demand for 
Medical Care:  Evidence from a Randomized Experiment, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 251 (1987). 
 184. Sujha Subramanian, Impact of Medicaid Copayments on Patients with Cancer:  
Lessons for Medicaid Expansion Under Health Reform, 49 MED. CARE 842, 843-45 (2011).  
After co-payments were imposed, Georgians reduced their supplies of prescription drugs by 
127 days compared to Texas and by 150 days compared to South Carolina.  Id. at 844. 
 185. Id. at 844. 
 186. Id. 
 187. See Michael E. Chernew et al., Impact of Decreasing Copayments on Medication 
Adherence Within a Disease Management Environment, 27 HEALTH AFFS. 103, 111 (2008) 
(reducing copayments for prescription drugs increased medication adherence by several 
percentage points); Niteesh K. Choudry et al., Should Patients Receive Secondary Preven-
tion Medications for Free After a Myocardial Infarction? An Economic Analysis, 26 HEALTH 
AFFS. 186, 186 (2007) (finding cost savings and decreased mortality); Teresa B. Gibson, 
Ronald J. Ozminkowski & Ron Z. Goetzel, The Effects of Prescription Drug Cost Sharing:  A 
Review of the Evidence, 11 AM. J. MANAGED CARE 730, 737 (2005); Dana P. Goldman et al., 
Prescription Drug Cost Sharing:  Associations with Medication and Medical Utilization and 
Spending and Health, 298 JAMA 61, 61, 66 (2007). 
 188. See Goldman et al., id. at 65; John V. Jacobi, Consumer-Directed Health Care and 
the Chronically Ill, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 531, 566-67 (2005); Paul Fronstin & Sara R. 
Collins, The 2nd Annual EBRI/Commonwealth Fund Consumerism in Health Survey, 
2006:  Early Experience with High-Deductible and Consumer-Driven Plans, EBRI ISSUE 
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Plan to beneficiaries who agree to certain responsibilities, includ-
ing doing their best to stay healthy and attending health im-
provement programs as directed by their health providers.189  
Those who do not comply with the Enhanced Benefit Plan re-
quirements and those who do not opt into the Enhanced Benefit 
Plan are kept in the Basic Benefits Plan, which has many fewer 
benefits.190  In particular, Basic Benefits do not include diabetes 
care, weight management, nutrition education, smoking cessation, 
or substance abuse and mental health services—the very services 
that might mitigate the costs of chronic illness among the benefi-
ciaries.191  The program raised concerns among physicians, who 
were expected to monitor and perhaps enforce plan require-
ments.192  One evaluation found that only 10 to 15% of Medicaid 
beneficiaries chose to participate in the Enhanced Benefit Plan in 
its first year, even though no enforcement procedures had been 
implemented.193  
C. Evidence for Health Improvement 
Wellness programs generally are expected to improve health 
and save money. The evidence for both is less than one would 
hope, but there is somewhat more good news for health improve-
ment than for saving money.194  There is a burgeoning literature 
on the effects of wellness programs, although most concede several 
limitations.195  First, many studies were conducted in single work-
places with a relatively small sample size, making it difficult to 
determine whether the population is representative of all workers.  
In some cases, only a small proportion of employees participated.  
  
 189. See W. VA. DEP’T. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RES., WEST VIRGINIA MEDICAID MEMBER 
AGREEMENT (DRAFT) (2005), available at http://www.wvdhhr.org/medred/handouts/wvmedi-
caidmemberagrmnt.pdf. 
 190. See W. VA. DEP’T. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RES., CHAPTER 527:  COVERED SERVICES, 
LIMITATIONS, AND EXCLUSIONS FOR MOUNTAIN HEALTH CHOICES (2009), available at 
http://www.dhhr.wv.gov/bms/Documents/bms_manuals_Chapter_527MountainHealthChoic
es.pdf.  
 191. Id. at 23. 
 192. See Gene Bishop & Amy C. Brodkey, Personal Responsibility and Physician Re-
sponsibility—West Virginia’s Medicaid Plan, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 756, 756-758 (2006). 
 193. MICHAEL HENDRYX ET AL., W. VA. UNIV. INST. FOR HEALTH POLICY RESEARCH, 
EVALUATION OF MOUNTAIN HEALTH CHOICES:  IMPLEMENTATION, CHALLENGES, AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS (2009), available at http://www.hsc.wvu.edu/wvhealthpolicy/reports/ 
WV_paper_rev%20FINAL.pdf. 
 194. See Mark A. Rothstein & Heather L. Harrell, Health Risk Reduction Programs in 
Employer-Sponsored Health Plans:  Part I—Efficacy, 51 J. AM. C. OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. 
MED. 943 (2009) (summarizing studies). 
 195. Id. at 945, 949; Tu & Mayrell, supra note 67, at 6-7. 
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Second, some programs, especially the most successful, were high-
ly individualized and intensive, with repeated interactions with 
employees, which may be difficult or expensive to translate else-
where.196  Third, some studies have no control groups against 
which to test the results in order to determine whether the pro-
gram or external factors, such as growing public awareness of 
health risks, caused any change. Fourth, few studies are random-
ized, controlled trials, and so are unable to reject the possibility—
some would say probability—that those who participate in well-
ness programs are more inclined to improve their health, even 
without any formal program, than those who do not participate.197  
Fifth, most reports review recently adopted, rather than mature, 
programs, whose results may change over time, assuming they 
remain in effect.  Finally, few studies followed participants longer 
than six months, so it is not known whether the participants con-
tinued their changed behavior after the program ended.  Indeed, 
literature reviews have concluded that behavior change is not nec-
essarily sustained over time.198  Not often mentioned is the possi-
bility that studies of successful programs, like studies showing 
investigational drugs to be effective, are more likely to be pub-
lished than studies showing little or no effect.199  Companies that 
fund their own studies may have a say in whether or not the re-
sults are published. 
Among the more successful wellness programs are smoking ces-
sation programs; however, the proportion of smokers in a cessa-
tion program who quit, even for six months, seems surprisingly 
low, ranging between 5 and 15%.200  The incidence of smoking in 
the United States is now about 20%, having declined steadily for 
several decades.201  Those who continue to smoke may have the 
  
 196. Tu & Mayrell, supra note 67. 
 197. Rothstein & Harrell, supra note 194, at 949. 
 198. See Cahill & Perera, supra note 175; Sutherland et al., supra note 175 at 74S. 
 199. See K. Dickerson et al., Publication Bias and Clinical Trials, 8 CONTROL CLINICAL 
TRIALS 343, 351 (1987); Panayiotis A. Kyzas, Konstantinos T. Loizou & John P.A. Ioanni-
dis, Selective Reporting Biases in Cancer Prognostication Factor Studies, 97 J. NAT’L 
CANCER INST. 1043, 1050 (2005); Erick H. Turner et al., Selective Publication of Antide-
pressant Trials and Its Influence on Apparent Efficacy, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 252, 256 
(2008). 
 200. See TERRY F. PECHACEK ET. AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., BEST 
PRACTICES FOR COMPREHENSIVE TOBACCO CONTROL PROGRAMS—2007 (2007), available 
at http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/stateandcommunity/best_practices/pdfs/2007/BestPractices_ 
Complete.pdf. 
 201. AM. CANCER SOC’Y. CANCER FACTS & FIGURES 2011 35 (2011), available at 
http://www.cancer.org/acs/groups/content/@epidemiologysurveilance/documents/document/a
cspc-029771.pdf; Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
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most difficulty quitting.  Relapse is common, even after “success-
ful” cessation programs; it can take many tries for a smoker to 
quit permanently.202  Most experts recommend comprehensive to-
bacco control programs that include taxation, public education 
campaigns, and legal restrictions on sales and locations for smok-
ing.203  Nonetheless, smoking cessation is a common wellness pro-
gram goal, because the health benefits (apart from some weight 
gain) are well established.204 
Programs to reduce blood pressure (to lower or prevent hyper-
tension and ultimately heart disease), and to a lesser extent cho-
lesterol levels (to prevent heart disease), may be perhaps easier to 
implement, partly because of the availability of reasonably effec-
tive pharmaceuticals.205  Programs that eliminate employee cost-
sharing for prescription drugs have succeeded in improving ad-
herence to drugs that can prevent heart attacks.206  Reducing risk 
factors for diabetes, however, has proved to be more difficult.  The 
rising incidence of Type II diabetes has influenced the push for 
preventive health care and wellness programs.  High blood sugar 
levels, along with high blood pressure and lipids, create risks for 
Type II diabetes, which in turn, is a risk factor for heart disease, 
stroke, kidney diseases, and other medical problems.207  Many pro-
grams focus on reducing blood sugar levels, but a careful, random-
ized, controlled trial found that the population receiving intensive 
therapy to reduce its average blood sugar to normal levels (about 4 
  
Servs., Current Cigarette Smoking Prevalence Among Working Adults—United States, 
2004-2010, 60 MORTALITY & MORBIDITY WKLY. REP. 1305, 1305 (2011), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6038a2.htm. 
 202. See PECHACEK ET. AL., supra note 200. 
 203. See Kenneth Warner, Tobacco Policy Research:  Insights and Contributions to Pub-
lic Health Policy, in TOBACCO CONTROL POLICY 3, 13-15 (Kenneth Warner ed., 2006); 
PECHACEK ET. AL., supra note 200; Tobacco Use, GUIDE TO COMMUNITY PREVENTIVE 
SERVS. (Feb. 7, 2011), http://www.thecommunityguide.org/tobacco/index.html. 
 204. See generally INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., ENDING THE TOBACCO 
PROBLEM:  A BLUEPRINT FOR THE NATION (Richard D. Bonnie et al. eds., 2007); U.S. 
Surgeon Gen., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF 
SMOKING:  A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL (2004). 
 205. See Ara V. Chobanian et al., The Seventh Report of the Joint National Committee on 
Prevention, Detection, Evaluation, and Treatment of High Blood Pressure:  The JNC 7 Re-
port, 289 JAMA 2560 (2003).  But see ACCORD Study Grp., Effects of Intensive Blood-
Pressure Control in Type 2 Diabetes Mellitis, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1575, 1584 (2010) 
(finding that reducing blood pressure did not reduce the rate of fatal and nonfatal major 
cardiovascular events). 
 206. See, e.g., Niteesh K. Choudry et al., At Pitney Bowes, Value-Based Insurance Design 
Cut Copayment and Increased Drug Adherence, 29 HEALTH AFFS. 1995, 1997-1998 (2010). 
 207. See Thomas Almdal et al., The Independent Effect of Type 2 Diabetes Mellitus on 
Ischemic Heart Disease, Stroke, and Death:  A Population-Based Study of 13,000 Men and 
Women with 20 Years of Follow-up, 164 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1422 (2004). 
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to 6%) experienced more deaths than the group receiving standard 
therapy (2.6% v. 1.8%), which reduced its average level to about 
7.5%.208  These results contradicted the standard recommendations 
for diabetes control, and the researchers stopped the trial.209  On 
the other hand, physical fitness may reduce the incidence of diabe-
tes, even without weight loss.210   
Significant weight loss appears to be the most difficult goal to 
achieve and maintain.211 Short-term weight loss appears to be the 
most common result.212  The average amount of weight lost in suc-
cessful programs appears to be relatively small.213  Of course, av-
erages hide individual differences; some participants may have 
lost a great deal while others lost little or even gained weight.  
The real problem appears to be maintaining weight loss.214  Par-
ticipants often regain some or all of the weight they lose within a 
year or so.215  There remains scientific uncertainty about the phys-
iology of weight gain and loss.  A recent study suggests that at 
least some people may have hormonal or other biological resis-
tance to weight loss—possibly a built-in survival mechanism that 
served humanity well in prehistoric times of famine.216  Sustained 
  
 208. Action to Control Cardiovascular Risk in Diabetes Study Grp., Effects of Intensive 
Glucose Lowering in Type 2 Diabetes, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2545, 2545, 2550-51 (2008) 
(explaining that both populations began with an average blood sugar level of 8.1% and that 
comparative rates of death in the intensive versus standard therapy groups were 2.6% 
versus 1.8% for cardiac deaths and 5% versus 4% for all causes of death). 
 209. Id. at 2546. 
 210. See Chobanian et al., supra note 205; Steven N. Blair & Tim S. Church, The Fit-
ness, Obesity, and Health Equation:  Is Physical Activity the Common Denominator? 292 
JAMA 1232 (2004). 
 211. James W. Anderson et al., Long-Term Weight Loss Maintenance:  A Meta-Analysis 
of U.S. Studies, 74 AM. J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 579, 583 (2001). 
 212. Id. 
 213. See, e.g., Ron Z. Goetzel et al., Second-Year Results of an Obesity Prevention Pro-
gram at The Dow Chemical Company, 52 J. Occupational Envtl. Med. 291, 294 (2010) (re-
porting that wellness program participants weighed 1.3 pounds less than non-participants, 
primarily because non-participants gained an average of 1.3 pounds); Laurie M. Anderson 
et al., The Effectiveness of Worksite Nutrition and Physical Activity Interventions for Con-
trolling Employee Overweight and Obesity:  A Systematic Review, 37 AM. J. PREVENTIVE 
MED. 340, 350 (2009) (finding that studies of worksite programs achieved a pooled average 
weight loss of 2.8 pounds per person over six to twelve months).   
 214. Rena R. Wing & James O. Hill, Successful Weight Loss Maintenance, 21 ANN. REV. 
NUTRITION 323, 324, 336 (2001). 
 215. Id. at 325; Anderson et al., supra note 211, at 579; Leslie K. John et al., Financial 
Incentives for Extended Weight Loss:  A Randomized Controlled Trial, 26 J. GEN. INTERN. 
MED. 621, 621 (2011); Melanie Warziski Turk et al., Randomized Clinical Trials of Weight 
Loss Maintenance: A Review, 24 J. CARDIOVASCULAR NURSING 58, 59 (2009). 
 216. Priya Suminthran et al., Long Term Persistence of Hormonal Adaptions to Weight 
Loss, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1597, 1603 (2011).  See also Paul S. MacLean et al., Biology’s 
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weight loss appears to require life-style changes or many years of 
intensive management, possibly including medication to regulate 
hormonal control of appetite.217  Indeed, the limited success with 
most programs may encourage the use of bariatric surgery.218  
The health effects of weight loss are also mixed.  Repeatedly los-
ing and regaining weight (yo-yo dieting) seems unhealthy.  There 
is even controversy about what constitutes a healthy weight.219  
Most studies have concluded that the overweight population does 
not have higher mortality rates than the normal weight popula-
tion.220  Rather, increased risks of death, and especially increased 
costs, primarily arise in the obese population, mostly concentrated 
in the so-called morbidly obese (BMI  40).221  Compounding the 
confusion, some popular discussions of obesity include the cate-
gory of overweight (BMI 25 < 30) with that of obesity (BMI  30).222  
In determining health effects and costs, however categorizing the 
overweight with the obese is an error.  
Nonetheless, the population weight curve has been shifting 
slightly to the right in the past two decades, meaning that an in-
creasing proportion of the population has moved from the normal 
weight category to the overweight category, and from overweight 
to obese.223  The question is whether that matters—for the popula-
tion’s health or the nation’s economy.  Some scholars argue that 
adverse consequences of obesity are overblown.224  The association 
between obesity and chronic diseases is well established, but the 
  
Response to Dieting:  The Impetus for Weight Regain, 301 AM. J. PHYSIOLOGY—
REGULATORY, INTEGRATIVE & COMP. PHYSIOLOGY R581 (2011). 
 217. See Thomas A. Wadden et al., Four-Year Weight Losses in the Look AHEAD Study:  
Factors Associated with Long-Term Success, 19 OBESITY 1987 (2011) (Framingham study 
reporting that women who lost weight gained more than those who did not). 
 218. See Joseph Proietto, Why Is Treating Obesity So Difficult? Justification for the Role 
of Bariatric Surgery, 195 MED. J. AUSTL. 144 (2011). 
 219. See PAUL F. CAMPOS, THE OBESITY MYTH 179 (2004). 
 220. John Cawley & Chad Meyerhoefer, The Medical Care Costs of Obesity:  An Instru-
mental Variables Approach 3 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16467, 
2010), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w16467. 
 221. Id. at 39; Kevin R. Fontaine et al., Years of Life Lost Due to Obesity, 289 JAMA 187, 
189 (2003).  Obesity is classified into 3 grades, based on BMI:  grade 1, BMI 30 35; grade 2, 
BMI 35 40; and grade 3, BMI 40.  Flegal et al., supra note 130, at 236. 
 222. See, e.g., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 10; Levi et al., 
supra note 142. 
 223. See Flegal et al., supra note 130, at 239; U.S. Obesity Trends, CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/data/trends.html (last updated July 
21, 2011). 
 224. See MICHAEL GARD & JAN WRIGHT, THE OBESITY EPIDEMIC:  SCIENCE, 
MORALITY AND IDEOLOGY 91-102 (2005) (analyzing the evidence); J. ERIC OLIVER, FAT 
POLITICS:  THE REAL STORY BEHIND AMERICA'S OBESITY EPIDEMIC 23-27 (2006); PAUL 
F. CAMPOS, THE OBESITY MYTH 20-25 (2004). 
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actual relationship is less well understood.  Does obesity cause 
chronic diseases or do chronic diseases lead to obesity?  Is some-
thing else going on?  Must the trend toward a larger population, so 
to speak, mean that the country will experience increasing per-
sonal illness and financial costs? 
D. Evidence for Cost Savings 
The literature abounds with reports of cost savings produced by 
wellness programs.225  A recent meta-analysis of studies reported 
that wellness programs cost employers an average of $144 per 
employee per year and lowered annual medical costs by an aver-
age of $358 per employee per year, slightly lower than earlier re-
views.226  Overall, the evidence that wellness programs save money 
is more mixed.227  Several studies report increases in some costs 
and decreases in others.228  Recent evidence suggests that cost sav-
ings may depend on very intensive programs and substantial in-
centives.229  Indeed, the most frequently cited examples of cost sav-
ings are from large employers that can afford to offer free services, 
like on-site gyms, or more intensive, individualized care pro-
grams.230      
Whether particular wellness programs save money also depends 
on how costs are defined.231  Costs typically include health insur-
ance premiums, but may or may not include the employee’s share 
of the premium.  If the employer considers only its own premium 
contribution to be a cost, rather than the total premium, including 
the employee’s contribution, the results may not reflect total costs.  
  
 225. An often-cited study is Steven G. Aldana, Financial Impact of Health Promotion 
Programs:  A Comprehensive Review of the Literature, 15 AM. J. HEALTH PROMOTION 296 
(2001).  Aldana’s website states that he is the CEO and founder of WellSteps, a company 
that sells wellness programs.  Biography, STEPHEN G. ALDANA PH.D., http://www. 
stevealdana.com/index_bio.php (last visited Nov. 9, 2011). 
 226. Katherine Baicher et al., Workplace Wellness Programs Can Generate Savings, 29 
HEALTH AFFS. 304, 304 (2010) (reporting an average return on investment of $3.27 for 
medical costs per dollar spent and $2.73 per dollar spent for absenteeism).   
 227. See Rothstein & Harrell, supra note 194, at 948. 
 228. See, e.g., Todd Gilmer, Costs of Chronic Disease Management for Newly Insured 
Adults, 49 MED. CARE e22-27 (2011) (reporting that annual inpatient costs were $1260 
lower and outpatient costs were $723 greater, among participants in disease management). 
 229. See Tu & Mayrell, supra note 67, at 5. 
 230. See, e.g., Ron Z. Goetzel et al., The Long-Term Impact of Johnson & Johnson’s 
Health & Wellness Program on Employee Health Risks, 44 J. OCCUPATIONAL ENVTL. MED. 
417 (2002); Rachel M. Henke et al., Recent Experience in Health Promotion at Johnson & 
Johnson:  Lower Health Spending, Strong Return on Investment, 30 HEALTH AFFS. 490 
(2011).  
 231. See Tu & Mayrell, supra note 67.  
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The costs of absenteeism and productivity may or may not be in-
cluded or calculated separately.  In addition, to determine savings, 
one must estimate what costs would have been without the pro-
gram.  That calculation may or may not take into account the ef-
fects of both internal and external changes that would have af-
fected costs without the program.  For example, if the employer 
changed the benefit plan to reduce overall premiums by reducing 
benefits, increasing deductibles or cost-sharing, or by increasing 
the employee’s share of the premium, the employer’s own costs 
would be reduced regardless of a wellness program.  Similarly, the 
employer may have improved the work environment or moved to a 
different location that affects employee health or fitness. 
V.  IMPLICATIONS OF USING INSURANCE TO PROMOTE HEALTH 
The ACA’s encouragement of wellness programs has one advan-
tage and several disadvantages.  The advantage is largely sym-
bolic—it highlights the value of preventive measures to improve 
health.  Its disadvantages are both symbolic and practical.  The 
symbolism of health promotion is clouded by the emphasis on per-
sonal responsibility for health.  This symbolism is likely to perme-
ate public policy because it is embodied in insurance, which in 
turn expresses powerful influences on social attitudes about col-
lective versus personal responsibility.  The ACA is structured to 
establish a community with equal access to care by requiring uni-
form group premium rates, guaranteeing all legal residents health 
coverage, and eliminating pre-existing condition exclusions and 
caps on claims.232  This structure eliminates risk classifications 
that distinguish one individual from any other in any risk pool.  
Wellness programs that charge some individuals in the pool more 
than others reintroduce the very risk classification that the ACA 
rejected.233  Thus, the message of the ACA’s wellness provision is 
that there is an exception to the ACA’s overall goal of ensuring 
near-universal access to care at the same group rates, and that 
exception is for people who fail to conform to an ideal of normal 
health status.  
The use of financial incentives to adjust the price of insurance to 
individuals within a given risk pool can be viewed in quite differ-
ent ways.  On one hand, it can be seen as a new way for insurers 
  
 232. See Mariner, supra note 40 at 439.  See also supra text accompanying notes 2, 55. 
 233. Mariner, supra note 12, at 222. 
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to encourage their policyholders to take care of the insured prop-
erty (the person’s body) so as not to cause abnormal wear and tear 
or loss.  An analogy might be requiring property owners to install 
smoke detectors as a condition of homeowner’s insurance cover-
age.  In this view, using preventive services like disease-screening 
tests is analogous to installing smoke detectors, so that a person 
can detect an incipient disease in time to prevent serious damage.  
On the other hand, people are not property. Health risks are not 
as easily detected as fires.  Even when they are, the means to con-
trol or prevent future diseases are not necessarily under a person’s 
control.  
Financial incentives make sense to encourage rational decisions 
among people who are in a position to respond voluntarily.  How-
ever, physicians, not patients, make most decisions about medical 
care.234  The “market” for medical care is unlike other consumer 
product markets, because the consumer does not choose what 
product to buy (except for certain elective services, such as cos-
metic plastic surgery).235  Rather, the consumer typically decides 
whether to accept or reject a physician’s recommendation for di-
agnostic, therapeutic, or rehabilitative care.  Furthermore, medi-
cal recommendations are unlike a salesman’s recommendation 
about which automobile or refrigerator or even insurance policy to 
buy, because a patient may need medical care to survive in a way 
that is entirely different from the need for a new car or refrigera-
tor.  As Deborah Stone points out, patients do not “use” health 
care, in the sense that consumers “use” consumer goods.236  Pa-
tients tend to receive whatever their physicians recommend.  
Therefore, attempts to reduce the demand for care would be better 
redirected to the providers who create the demand.237  In this re-
gard, increasing costs payable by patients, including increased 
premiums, deductibles, and co-payments, appears both ineffective 
  
 234. See Mark A. Hall, Trust, Law and Medicine, 55 STAN. L. REV. 463 (2002). 
 235. See id; Mariner, supra note 24. 
 236. Deborah Stone, Moral Hazard, 36 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 887, 894 (2011). 
 237. Examples of current efforts to encourage physicians to provide more cost-effective 
care include proposed new payment methods, such as bundled or global payments and 
accountable care organizations.  See the CMS final regulations for accountable care organi-
zations for the Medicare Shared Savings Program.  U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Medicare Shared Savings Program:  Accountable 
Care Organizations, Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,802 (Nov. 2, 2011) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 
425); Aricca D. Van Citters et al., Four Health Care Organizations' Efforts to Improve Pa-
tient Care and Reduce Costs, COMMONWEALTH FUND, Jan. 13, 2012, http://www. 
commonwealthfund.org/Publications/Case-Studies/2012/Jan/Four-Health-Care-
Organizations.aspx. 
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and unfair.  Cost-sharing can discourage people from obtaining 
medical care at exactly the time when they need care.238   
It may be objected that people do choose to “use” preventive 
care, because preventive services, unlike most medical care, are 
not recommended by physicians to treat an acute medical prob-
lem.  It is true that patients can decide whether and when to get 
preventive services.  To this extent, financial incentives can influ-
ence the receipt of preventive care.239  Exactly what services to get, 
however, remains essentially a medical determination.  
It might also be objected that patients bear some responsibility 
for their medical needs, to which physicians respond by recom-
mending care.  Indeed, this appears to be the sentiment underly-
ing claims that unhealthy people are responsible for excessive 
health care costs.240  There is no doubt that we can affect our own 
health in many ways; we should listen to our grandmother’s ad-
vice on staying healthy. Nonetheless, the influences of our genes, 
environment, income, and opportunities constrict our ability to 
follow that advice to a greater or lesser extent.241 
There are practical problems with locating wellness programs 
within insurance.  Their benefits and risks depend significantly on 
how they are structured—whether and what kinds of incentives 
they use.  Programs that offer free services at the workplace have 
few disadvantages, unless the employer monitors their use and 
considers the information in retention and promotion decisions.242  
Although incentives appear to improve results, they also invite 
discrimination against those who are least able to afford higher 
insurance costs. 
Employer workplace wellness programs have the advantage of 
being generally accessible to employees and can be administered 
as part of the employer’s health benefit plans.  However, these 
advantages may be outweighed by practical concerns, especially 
for private sector employers.  With unemployment at more than 
8% (not counting those who have given up looking for work), the 
proportion of the nonelderly population with any prospect of em-
  
 238. Stone, supra note 236, at 891. 
 239. See text accompanying supra notes 183-88. 
 240. See Abigail C. Saguy & Kevin W. Riley, Weighing Both Sides:  Morality, Mortality, 
and Framing the Contests over Obesity, 30 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 879, 890-91 (2005). 
 241. See supra note 119. 
 242. See infra text accompanying notes 258-62. 
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ployer-sponsored health coverage is declining.243  First, not all em-
ployers offer health plans, much less wellness programs.244  High 
employee turnover can dissuade an employer from offering health 
benefits.  If Congress eliminates the employers’ tax deduction for 
contributions to benefit plans (and the exclusion from employee 
income of the total contribution), there will be less reason for em-
ployers to offer a plan.245  Small employers in difficult economic 
times are hard-pressed to provide benefits, even with the incen-
tives provided by the ACA.246  Their employees will need to find 
coverage in commercial plans offered through the health insur-
ance exchanges or Medicaid.  Insurers who offer plans through an 
exchange may not offer wellness programs, especially if the re-
quired essential health benefits prove to be costly.247  Those insur-
ers may have fewer incentives to include wellness program ele-
ments, because their covered population may be somewhat tran-
sient. 
Second, employer plans do not necessarily cover all employees. 
Many employers have temporary or part-time employees who need 
not be offered benefits.248  In the current economy, employers may 
rely on such part-time employees and be reluctant to offer them 
special benefits.  Temporary employees come and go and may 
work for different employers, either simultaneously or one after 
another.  Employee turnover makes it difficult for both employees 
and employers to reap the long-term benefits of wellness pro-
grams.  This is exacerbated in businesses with a majority of low-
  
 243. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T. OF LABOR, THE EMPLOYMENT 
SITUATION—JANUARY 2012 (2012), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/ 
pdf/empsit.pdf.  As of January 2012, the employment rate was 8.3%.  Id. 
 244. Fronstin, supra note 151, at 5 (reporting that 58.7% of the nonelderly population 
had employer-sponsored health benefits in 2010). 
 245. See Stephen Langel, ‘Super Committee’ Looks to Health for Savings to Reduce Defi-
cits, 30 HEALTH AFFS. 1819 (2011) (noting budget pressure to obtain an estimated $250 
billion in tax losses). 
 246. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH & EDUCATIONAL TRUST, supra note 
164, at 34. 
 247. Health insurers offering plans through health insurance exchanges must cover 
“essential health benefits” to qualify as acceptable plans.  Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1311, 124 Stat. 119 (2010),  The definition of essential 
health benefits is quite broad and is to be based on a typical employer plan.  Id.  The Secre-
tary of Health and Human Services, who is responsible for defining such benefits, has al-
lowed the states to establish their own benchmarks for defining benefit.  U.S. Dep’t  
of Health and Human Servs., Essential Health Benefits:  HHS Informational Bulletin, 
HEALTHCARE.GOV, http://www.healthcare.gov/news/factsheets/2011/12/essential-health-ben- 
efits12162011a.html (last updated Feb. 24, 2012). 
 248. Clyde W. Summers, Contingent Employment in the United States, 18 COMP. LAB. 
L.J. 503, 506 (1997). 
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wage workers.  Besides being hard-pressed to afford coverage, low-
wage workers may change employers more frequently than high-
paid employees.  Changes in income may enable employees to 
qualify for Medicaid in one year, but not the next.249  These shifts 
create inconsistencies in coverage and, presumably, participation 
in wellness programs. 
Third, not all eligible employees join their employer’s or union 
plan.250  Some may get coverage from a spouse’s health plan, but 
the most common reasons for not having health insurance are the 
cost of the plan and beliefs that insurance is not necessary.251  The 
price of insurance is unlikely to decline significantly after the ACA 
becomes fully effective.252  Although the ACA provides incentives 
for small businesses to offer health benefits, in the current econ-
omy, with diminished demand and the continued rise in health 
care costs, insurance premiums may remain out of reach for many 
small businesses.253 
Finally, workplace programs won’t directly help family mem-
bers, including children, unless the employee has family coverage 
and the wellness program makes family members eligible to par-
ticipate.   Employers may require all participating members of the 
family to meet wellness goals in order to earn rewards.  Of course, 
parents may apply what they learn in the workplace to their fam-
ily members.   
Public employers, especially state and local government em-
ployees, may have fewer of the above disadvantages, because their 
employees are more likely to remain in government employment 
  
 249. See Sommers & Rosenbaum, supra note 109. 
 250. See Jean M. Abraham & Roger Feldman, Taking Up or Turning Down:  New Esti-
mates of Household Demand for Employee-Sponsored Health Insurance, 47 INQUIRY 17 
(2010); Fronstin, supra note 151, at 1 (finding that 51.5% of individuals with employer-
based health benefits had coverage in their own names in 2010). 
 251. See Fronstin, supra note 151; CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF 
COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS:  CONSUMER INCOME:  INCOME, POVERTY, AND 
HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES:  2010 (2011), available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2008pubs/p60-235.pdf; Mark W. Stanton, Employer-Sponsored 
Health Insurance:  Trends in Cost and Access, RESEARCH IN ACTION (Agency for Healthcare 
Research & Quality, Rockville, Md.), SEPT. 2004, available at http://www.ahrq.gov/ 
research/empspria/empspria.htm. 
 252. See Patricia F. Adams et al., Summary Health Statistics for the U.S. Population:  
National Health Interview Survey, 2009, VITAL HEALTH STAT. (Ctrs. for Disease Control & 
Prevention, Washington, D.C.), Dec. 2010, at 1, available at http://www.cdc.gov/ 
nchs/data/series/sr_10/sr10_248.pdf (finding that almost half the nonelderly population did 
not have health insurance because of its cost). 
 253. See Edward A. Miller, Affordability of Health Insurance to Small Business:  Impli-
cations of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 36 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 
539 (2011). 
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for longer periods of time.  Many government employees are in 
collective bargaining units, which may be able to negotiate the 
wellness programs that employees seek.254  In contrast, state Med-
icaid beneficiaries are especially likely to have interrupted eligibil-
ity.255    
In summary, it is probably overly optimistic to expect employer 
programs to achieve the kind of results that would substantially 
improve overall health or reduce the costs of chronic diseases.  
Behavior change is difficult, especially when it is not self-
motivated.256  Medicare’s experience with disease management 
programs shows how hard, and expensive, it can be.257 
A different disadvantage of placing wellness programs within 
employer benefit plans is their potential for discrimination against 
employees who are considered to be irresponsible about their 
health.   One possibility may be increased scrutiny by fellow work-
ers, creating pressure to lose weight or stop smoking, for example.  
Employees should be aware of the existence of wellness programs 
and may observe and comment on the behavior of fellow employ-
ees and whether they have visible changes.  The surveillance lit-
erature suggests that mechanisms for monitoring behavior can 
produce conformity among the “watched.”258  Incorporating well-
ness programs into employee benefit programs may heighten 
awareness of the differential costs for employees who do not meet 
health standards.  This can encourage the idea that individual 
employees with specific conditions are raising the cost of health 
insurance to the rest of the workforce.259  The fact that conditions 
like obesity, but not sports injuries, for example, are singled out 
  
 254. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, USDL-12-0094, UNION 
MEMBERS—2011 (2011), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf.  
 255. See Sommers & Rosenbaum, supra note 109. 
 256. See Harald Schmidt et al., Carrots, Sticks, and Health Care Reform—Problems with 
Wellness Incentives, 302 NEW ENG. J. MED. e3 (2009).  See generally, M. J. Grawitch et al., 
The Path to a Healthy Workplace:  A Critical Review Linking Healthy Workplace Practices, 
Employee Well-being, and Organizational Improvements, 58 CONSULTING PSYCHOL. J.:  
PRAC. & RES. 129 (2006). 
 257. Machlin et al., supra note 108, at 1.  About 45% of people with public insurance 
have at least 2 chronic conditions, compared with 1/3 of people with private insurance and 
16% of uninsured persons.  Id.  
 258. See, e.g., Kevin D. Haggerty & Richard V. Ericson, The New Politics of Surveillance 
and Visibility, in THE NEW POLITICS OF SURVEILLANCE AND VISIBILITY 1, 22 (Kevin D. 
Haggerty & Richard V. Ericson eds., 2005). 
 259. See KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH & EDUCATIONAL TRUST, supra 
note 164, at 169 (reporting that 32% of large firms and 9% of small firms offering wellness 
programs use insurance claims “to identify individuals and encourage wellness participa-
tion”). 
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for attention, can create a distorted impression of the costs of med-
ical care.  Social pressures arising in the workplace may be severe.  
Of greater significance is the possibility that employers will use 
health status as a criterion for employment or promotion.260  Peo-
ple with chronic diseases can face barriers to employment, wheth-
er because of their actual or perceived lower productivity, disabil-
ity costs, or simple prejudice.261  If insurance-based wellness pro-
grams encourage norms of personal responsibility for one’s own 
health, as may be expected, existing prejudices may be more easily 
justified on ostensibly objective grounds.  Those who fail to man-
age their own health risks can be seen as out of control and out-
side the normal pool of responsible employees.  Thus, defensible 
prejudice can rationalize discriminatory hiring policies. 262     
The law tends to support employers’ prerogatives to hire whom-
ever they wish and on such terms as they choose.   Employers can 
change the terms of employment whenever they choose for em-
ployees who have no written contract.263  Only 11.9% of the U.S. 
workforce (14.7 million people) was covered by a collective bar-
gaining agreement in 2010.264  This suggests that most of the 240 
million employees in the United States are employees at will.265  In 
theory, the employee at will, like the employer, is free to leave for 
  
 260. Amy B. Monahan & Daniel Schwarcz, Will Employers Undermine Health Reform by 
Dumping Sick Employees?, 97 VA. L. REV. 125, 128 (2011). 
 261. See OLIVER, supra note 224, at 61. 
 262. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories:  A Cognitive Bias Ap-
proach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1176 
(1995) (distinguishing prejudice, which refers to feelings about others, such as pity, disgust, 
or reverence, from discrimination, which means actions taken on the basis of prejudice, 
such as avoidance or exclusion; also noting some disagreement on the boundaries between 
the concepts). 
 263. Summers, supra note 248, at 504 (written contracts include individual contracts, 
which are used primarily for executives, and collective bargaining agreements). 
 264. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, USDL-12-0094, UNION 
MEMBERS—2011 (2011), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf.  This 
represents a decline from 20% (17.7 million) in 1983.  Id.  Slightly less than half of these 
(7.1 million) hold private sector jobs.  Id. 
 265. Employment at will is a common law doctrine that presumes that any employee 
without an individual or union contract may, at any time, quit the job or be terminated by 
the employer for good cause, for no reason, or even for a morally wrong reason.  Payne v. W. 
& Atl. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 518 (Tenn. 1884).  Employees who are hired without a defi-
nite term of employment are presumed to be employees at will.  Pickell v. Ariz. Components 
Co., 931 P.2d 1184, 1186 (Colo. 1997); Madden v. Omega Optical, Inc., 683 A.2d 386, 389 
(Vt. 1996); Hatfield v. Health Mgmt. Assocs. of W. Va., Inc., 672 S.E.2d 395, 401 (W. Va. 
2008); Garcia v. UniWyo Fed. Credit Union, 920 P.2d 642, 645 (Wyo. 1996).  See 5 J.D. LEE 
& BARRY LINDAHL, Employment at-will doctrine, in MODERN TORT LAW:  LIABILITY AND 
LITIGATION § 44.1 (2d ed. 2011) (collecting cases).  For employment data, see BUREAU OF 
LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 243.     
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any reason or no reason, which allows a mobile workforce to take 
advantage of new opportunities.266  In practice, however, especially 
in economically hard times, the scarcity of alternative jobs gives 
employees far less freedom to quit than the law presumes.267 
Both legislation and common law doctrine have created excep-
tions to the employee at will doctrine, selectively limiting the em-
ployer’s freedom to hire and fire.268  Courts have construed em-
ployee handbooks and policies as constituting a contract that de-
fines the terms and conditions of continued employment.269  It is 
unlikely that the provisions of a voluntary wellness program in 
the health benefits plan could be interpreted as a requirement.  
However, if an employer were to require participation or the 
achievement of specific health standards, these could be consid-
ered conditions of employment.  Some courts have required termi-
nation only for cause where the employment circumstances cre-
ated a reasonable expectation.270  In practice, such exceptions often 
oblige employers to offer a reason for terminating an employee in 
order to avoid a claim of wrongful discharge for a prohibited rea-
son.271  These erosions of the employment at will doctrine create an 
incentive for employers to track employee behavior to find a so-
cially acceptable reason for termination if the employer wants or 
needs to remove employees or jobs.272  Health insurance costs may 
prove to be such a reason. 
Statutory limits on employment decisions are better known and 
also can be a foundation for claims of wrongful discharge against 
public policy.  The most important, Title VII of the Civil Rights 
  
 266. H.G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER & SERVANT:  COVERING THE 
RELATION, DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES § 134 (1877). 
 267. Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom:  On Limiting the 
Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1405 (1967). 
 268. Common law limitations, such as those based on public policy, typically are not 
relevant to wellness programs and are not discussed here.  See generally, Employment At-
Will Exceptions by States, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (April 2008), 
http://www.ncsl.org/?tabid=13339. 
 269. See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880, 885 
(Mich. 1980); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081, 1087 (Wash. 1984) (en banc).  
Fewer than half of the states have implied a covenant of good faith and fair dealing to em-
ployment at will relationships, because the duty arose primarily when interpreting a con-
tract.  Suburban Hosp., Inc. v. Dwiggins, 596 A.2d 1069, 1077 (Md. 1991). 
 270. Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1264 (N.J. 1985), modified on 
reh’g, 499 A.2d 515 (N.J. 1985). 
 271. Paula G. Ardelean et al., The Development of Employment Rights and Responsibili-
ties, 25 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 449, 451 (2010).  According to the authors, this can discour-
age employers from taking a chance on new employees or firing unproductive employees.  
Id. at 457. 
 272. See generally id. 
File: 271 Mariner Article REVISED_R2.doc Created on:  4/11/2012 11:17:00 AM Last Printed: 4/11/2012 11:38:00 AM 
318 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 50 
 
Act of 1964, prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis 
of race, color, national origin, religion and sex.273  The federal Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act,274 the American’s with Dis-
abilities Act (“ADA”),275 the Family and Medical Leave Act,276 and 
the Genetic Information Non-discrimination Act (“GINA”)277 all 
restrict employer decision making.  However, such statutes typi-
cally do not apply to small businesses with fewer than fifteen or 
twenty employees, and small businesses employ the majority of 
American workers. 278    
A recent federal district court decision underscored the em-
ployer’s remaining freedom to require employees to sacrifice fam-
ily and perhaps health as a condition of advancement.279  Judge 
Loretta A. Preska dismissed claims of gender discrimination 
against Bloomberg L.P., finding that “[t]he law does not require 
companies to ignore or stop valuing dedication, however un-
healthy that may be for family life.”280  Her decision noted that 
Bloomberg “explicitly makes all-out dedication its expectation,”281 
but concluded that “the law does not mandate ‘work-life’ bal-
ance.”282  The decision emphasized that the employee, rather than 
the employer, had a choice:  “[a] female employee is free to choose 
to dedicate herself to the company at any cost, and, so far as this 
record suggests, she will rise in this organization accordingly.”283  
The decision suggests that poor employment conditions are ac-
ceptable as long as they apply to everyone. 
Adding wellness programs to employee compensation packages 
may invite similar pressures.  The relationship between insurance 
underwriting and wellness programs is illustrated by a challenge 
  
 273. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006).  The Civil Rights Act of 1964 is applicable to employ-
ers with at least fifteen employees.  § 2000e. 
 274. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2006) (applicable to employers with at least twenty employ-
ees). 
 275. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213. 
 276. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654. 
 277. Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (2008) (codified in scattered sections of 26 
U.S.C., 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.) (applicable to employers with at least fifteen employees). 
 278. States have enacted similar laws, often covering additional protected classes.  See 
Ardelean, supra note 271, at 453. 
 279. Equal Employ’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Bloomberg L.P., 778 F. Supp. 2d 458, 485 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011).   
 280. Bloomberg, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 486. 
 281. Id. at 485. 
 282. Id. 
 283. Id. at 486.  Apparently, the company treated all leaves of absence equally, so that 
women who took maternity leave were no worse off than others who took leaves for other 
reasons.  Id. at 484. 
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to a wellness program established by Broward County, Florida, 
through its health insurer. 284  The County deducted twenty dollars 
from the bi-weekly paycheck of each employee who did not com-
plete a health risk assessment and biometric screening.285  The 
insurer identified employees with asthma, hypertension, diabetes, 
congestive heart failure, or kidney disease and offered them a dis-
ease management coaching program.286  Employees who partici-
pated in the coaching program could receive some medications 
free.287  Bradley Seff, an employee who was charged the twenty 
dollar fees, claimed that the program violated the ADA by requir-
ing employees to submit themselves to medical examinations and 
questioning.288  A federal district court in Florida dismissed the 
claim, finding that the program was not discriminatory, because it 
was a legitimate method of assessing risks in order to plan future 
health insurance coverage.289  To do so, the court relied on the need 
for risk classification in insurance coverage.290 
The court found that the wellness program was part of the 
health insurance plan, which is quite correct.291  The ADA permits 
insurers to conduct bona fide risk classification and underwrit-
ing.292  That provision was intended to allow premium differences 
that are based on actuarial differences in claims costs.293  The 
court considered that provision to be a safe harbor from the ADA’s 
prohibition on medical inquiries and examinations.294  It concluded 
that the program was based on “insurance and risk assessment 
principles,” which were permitted by the ADA, and not on “some 
  
 284. Seff v. Broward Cnty., 778 F. Supp. 2d 1370, 1371 (S.D. Fla. 2011). 
 285. Seff, 778 F. Supp 2d. at 1372. 
 286. Id. 
 287. Id. 
 288. Id.  Under the ADA: 
a covered entity shall not require a medical examination and shall not make inquiries 
of an employee as to whether such employee is an individual with a disability or as to 
the nature or severity of the disability, unless such examination or inquiry is shown 
to be job-related and consistent with business necessity. 
42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A) (2010).  
 289. Seff, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 1374. 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. at 1373.  The court also found that, alternatively, the wellness program by itself 
could be considered to be a benefit plan, which would not change the analysis.  Id. at 1373 
n.5. 
 292. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c).  
 293. Barnes v. Benham Grp., Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1020 (D. Minn. 1998). 
 294. Seff, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 1375.  The court agreed with plaintiff that the wellness 
program was “not entirely optional,” since non-participants were charged a biweekly fee.  
Id. at 1373.  It is doubtful, but not impossible, that this conclusion was material to the 
court’s decision.  Others could just as easily conclude that the same program was voluntary. 
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independent desire for a healthy workforce.”295  The insurer, there-
fore, could alter costs based on an employee’s health risks.  Of 
course, it was the employer, not the insurer, that charged the fee, 
but the court noted that the employer was managing an employee 
benefit plan and could make financial decisions based on risk clas-
sifications.  This interpretation of the ADA would conflict with the 
ACA and HIPAA’s prohibition on discrimination based on health 
factors, were it not for the wellness program exception.296 
GINA and the HIPAA Privacy Regulations may have the most 
significant application to wellness programs, because many pro-
grams collect personal health information about individuals.297  
One of the most common elements of employer wellness programs 
is the Health Risk Assessment (HRA), which typically asks the 
employee to identify whether she has any health risks from a list 
and often includes biometric measures, such as blood tests.298  
Completing an HRA is often the prerequisite to receiving wellness 
program services, especially those intended to provide individual-
ized advice or coaching.299  GINA prohibits both employer group 
health plans and health insurers providing group coverage from 
“adjust[ing] premium or contribution amounts for the group cov-
ered under such plan on the basis of genetic information.”300  If 
employees volunteer genetic information that affects a wellness 
program reward, the prohibition can come into play.301 
A key difference between anti-discrimination laws and common 
law doctrine is that the former creates protected classes defined 
primarily (although not exclusively—religion is an exception) on 
immutable traits of the employee, like race, age, and genetics, 
while common law doctrine focuses on the employer’s reasons or 
the employee’s actions, without regard to such inherent traits.302  
Thus, employees who are not discriminated against on the basis of 
  
 295. Id. at 1375. 
 296. See infra text accompanying notes 56-81. 
 297. Tu & Mayrell, supra note 67, at 2-3. 
 298. Id.; KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH & EDUCATIONAL TRUST, supra 
note 164, at 169.  See Anderson v. City of Taylor, No. 04-74345, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
38075, at *12-18 (E.D. Mich. June 9, 2006) (finding that a blood draw pursuant to a manda-
tory wellness program for city fire fighters could be challenged as a violation of the employ-
ees’ rights to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth 
Amendment). 
 299. Tu & Mayrell, supra note 67, at 2. 
 300. Genetic Information Non-discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 110-233, §§ 101(a), 102(a), 
122 Stat. 881, 883, 888 (2008).  
 301. Bard, supra note 12. 
 302. See supra notes 268-71. 
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such protected traits are not eligible for statutory remedies for 
employment discrimination.  However, apart from the ADA, being 
at risk of a chronic disease is not a characteristic of a protected 
class, and even the ADA would not protect people who are merely 
at risk of future disease, unless the risk factor itself, such as hy-
pertension, qualified as an impairment that affected a major life 
activity or the employer perceived the person as having a disabil-
ity.303 
Some employers are already refusing to hire people who use to-
bacco, even if only outside the workplace.304  The reason most often 
given is to promote the health of their employees.305  In some cases, 
an employer’s aversion to smoking in the workplace has become 
an aversion to smokers, even if the employees do not smoke at 
work.  Decades of public education about the risks of smoking has 
made it socially acceptable to refuse employment to smokers.306  
People who are obese or even overweight may experience similar 
reactions.  Prejudice against people who are obese is hardly a re-
cent phenomenon.307  A New York court found that a prosecutor 
was entitled to strike a juror on the grounds that she was over-
weight, because he believed that heavy-set people tend to be very 
sympathetic toward any defendant.”308  Overweight children are 
often the target of teasing and discrimination.309  A recent proposal 
to characterize childhood obesity as grounds for charging parents 
with child neglect breaks new ground by assuming that a child’s 
  
 303. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (2010). 
 304. See, e.g., City of N. Miami v. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d 1025, 1026 (Fla. 1995), (upholding 
refusal to hire smoker); Rodrigues v. EG Sys., Inc., 639 F. Supp. 2d 131, 134 (D. Mass. 
2009).  Ten years after Kurtz, the City of North Miami rescinded its ban when it could not 
get enough applicants.  Linda Florea, St. Cloud Hires Smokers Again, ORLANDO SENTINEL, 
May 24, 2006, http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2006-05-24/news/OWNOSMOKE24_ 
1_1_smoking-policy-cloud-tobacco.  The World Health Organization was perhaps the most 
prominent entity to adopt a policy of not hiring smokers.  WHO Policy on Non-recruitment 
of Smokers or Other Tobacco Users:  Frequently Asked Questions, WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
http://www.who.int/employment/FAQs_smoking_English.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2011). 
 305. Id. 
 306. Jennifer Stuber et al., Smoking and the Emergence of a Stigmatized Social Status, 
67 SOC. SCI. & MED. 420 (2008). 
 307. DEBORAH L. RHODE, THE BEAUTY BIAS:  THE INJUSTICE OF APPEARANCE IN LIFE AND 
LAW (2010); SONDRA SOLOVAY, TIPPING THE SCALES OF JUSTICE:  FIGHTING WEIGHT-BASED 
DISCRIMINATION (2000); Elizabeth E. Theran, “Free to be Arbitrary and . . . Capricious”:  
Weight-Based Discrimination and the Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, 11 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 113, 152 (2001). 
 308. People v. Dolphy, 685 N.Y.S.2d 485, 487 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999). 
 309. Helen A. Hayden-Wade et al., Prevalence, Characteristics, and Correlates of Teasing 
Experiences Among Overweight Children vs. Non-overweight Peers, 13 OBESITY RESEARCH 
1381 (2005). 
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weight could be controlled by a responsible parent.310  So far, the 
British Medical Association has rejected it, but the idea could re-
surface.311 
In the past decade, however, several states have enacted legisla-
tion to protect employees from discrimination on the basis of em-
ployee behavior outside the workplace.312  While some states pro-
hibit discrimination on the basis of tobacco use at home, other 
states expand protection to any lawful conduct outside the work-
place.313  Like earlier anti-discrimination laws, these statutes ap-
pear to be intended to eliminate adverse employment decisions 
that are based on factors having nothing to do with job perform-
ance.  So far, there have not been similar reactions to the kinds of 
behavior changes encouraged by wellness programs, although crit-
ics point out that such policies not only create stigma, but also 
deprive qualified people of employment.314 
Monitoring employees for behaviors beyond job performance ob-
viously raises privacy questions.  Although the workplace is not a 
privacy zone, employees have long expected that their lives out-
side the workplace are none of their employer’s business.  That, 
too, is changing.  The ADA limits, but does not eliminate, affected 
employers’ access to medical information about employees.315  Em-
ployers may require employees to take a medical examination or 
employers may ask about medical conditions as long as these ex-
aminations are “job related and consistent with business neces-
sity.”316  The targets of wellness programs are not generally related 
to job performance.  Nonetheless, the growing salience of health to 
job performance may expand the sphere of permissible inquiries.  
Moreover, to the extent that business necessity includes financial 
constraints on the employer’s budget for labor, employees who are 
  
 310. Russell M. Viner et al., Childhood Protection and Obesity:  Framework for Practice, 
341 BRIT. MED. J. 3074 (2010). 
 311. Andrew Cole & Zosia Kmietowicz, BMA Rejects Call for Parents of Obese Children 
to Be Charged with Neglect, 334 BRIT. MED. J. 1343 (2007). 
 312. John Malouff et al., US Laws That Protect Tobacco Users from Employment Dis-
crimination, 2 TOBACCO CONTROL 132 (1993). 
 313. Id.  
 314. Brian Houle & Michael Siegel, Smoker-Free Workplace Policies:  Developing a Mod-
el of Public Health Consequences of Workplace Policies Barring Employment to Smokers, 18 
TOBACCO CONTROL 64 (2009); Leonard Glantz, Smoke Got in Their Eyes, WASH. POST, Dec. 
18, 2005, http://washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/17/AR200 
5121700945.html. 
 315. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(A) (2010) (prohibiting medical inquiries and examinations 
before an offer of employment).  The Family Medical Leave Act limits employers’ access to 
reasons for an employee’s medical leave.  29 C.F.R. §§ 825.306(a)(2)-(3), 825.307(a) (2011). 
 316. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A). 
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believed to generate high health insurance or absentee expenses 
may be subject to increasing monitoring or dismissal.  Of course, 
the ADA protects employees with a disability from termination 
solely for reasons of cost, but the class protected, like those speci-
fied in other federal anti-discrimination laws, remains only a sub-
set of all workers in the country.   Moreover, it may not be difficult 
for employers to avoid hiring individuals who appear obese or 
have obvious personal characteristics that the employer believes 
will lead to higher health costs.  
Maintaining appropriate confidentiality of medical records can 
be difficult when employees and their dependents are enrolled in 
employer-sponsored health plans.  Health insurers, like hospitals 
and other care providers, are obligated to keep medical records 
confidential and not disclose them without patient consent under 
HIPAA.317  Thus, group health plans have an obligation not to dis-
close claims information to an employer.318  But employers them-
selves are not necessarily subject to the HIPAA Privacy Rule, 
which applies only to “covered entities” who keep medical re-
cords.319  Employers who establish self-insured health plans, 
rather than buying a commercial insurance policy, are not deemed 
to keep records or to be insurers or providers.320  The self-insured 
plan is governed by a trust, which, in theory, is separate from the 
employer.321  Nonetheless, it may be unrealistic to expect that an 
employer, who may be the plan fiduciary as well as the boss, can 
keep an impermeable wall between employee performance records 
and its health plan or other employee medical records.  Companies 
may not receive individual data, but they do analyze aggregate 
employee results.  Smaller companies may be able to guess who is 
and is not participating in a wellness program.  Where incentives 
are offered, the payroll department must issue checks or deduct 
higher premiums for health insurance from the employee’s wages.  
Employers have direct access to other records, such as long-term 
disability and worker compensation claims.  They also search so-
cial media, such as Facebook, and use background checks to glean 
  
 317. 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.102-06, 164.500-34 (2011). 
 318. Id. § 164.504(f)(2)(ii)(C). 
 319. Id. § 160.103. 
 320. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (2010).  
 321. Id. § 1102 (2010) (establishment of plan and designation of fiduciary).  Many em-
ployers engage a commercial insurer to act as a third party administrator to handle claims 
and the collection of premiums and cost-sharing.   
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information about prospective and current employees.322  Note, 
however, that employers must keep confidential certain records 
that they are entitled to maintain pursuant to the ADA and the 
FMLA.323   
Still, employees may legitimately worry that medical informa-
tion that might threaten their jobs could be easily accessed by em-
ployers, whether deliberately, through sloppy practices, or as a 
result of genuine confusion about their obligations.  Employers 
who lawfully learn something about an employee’s medical condi-
tion are generally free to use it to make employment decisions, 
unless otherwise limited by federal or state anti-discrimination 
laws. 
There is a certain irony to the notion that the ADA, which was 
enacted to protect people with disabilities from being excluded 
from or disadvantaged in employment, would be interpreted to 
permit penalizing employees who are, at best, at risk for a disease 
or disability.  Discrimination on the basis of health factors may be 
as irrational as discrimination on the basis of disability.  Employ-
ers and insurers who ask applicants and employees about their 
health risks for purposes of determining the amounts employees 
pay for insurance are encouraged to impose differential costs on 
those with risks.  The ADA safe harbor was apparently intended 
to permit insurers to charge actuarially fair rates, based on a 
group’s claims experience.  A Florida district court found that the 
wellness program was “based on the theory that encouraging em-
ployees to get involved in their own healthcare leads to a more 
healthy population that costs less to insure.”324  Other courts may 
accept the same theory, especially since judges are not typically in 
a position to critically analyze the data on prevention and may see 
only the more enthusiastic summaries of advocates for preventive 
care.  This posture may encourage financial discrimination 
against employees who are believed to have medical conditions 
that would raise insurance costs.   
  
 322. Ardelean, supra note 271, at 463-67 (noting that employers may also monitor em-
ployee computers and, with some exceptions, email at work).  See LORI B. ANDREWS, I 
KNOW WHO YOU ARE AND I SAW WHAT YOU DID 122-23, 132 (2011). 
 323. The ADA requires employers who obtain medical information about an applicant to 
keep it confidential in a separate medical file, available only to supervisors and managers 
only as needed for work restrictions, accommodations, and emergency treatment.  42 U.S.C. 
§ 12112(d)(3)(B) (2010).  Equal Employment Opportunity Commission regulations now 
prohibit discrimination against employees on the basis of genetic information their employ-
ers find on social networks.  29 C.F.R. § 1635.8 (2010). 
 324. Seff v. Broward County, 778 F. Supp. 2d 1370, 1374 (S.D. Fla. 2011). 
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By increasing the permissible amount of incentives for wellness 
programs, the ACA encourages more financial incentives—cash 
payments, insurance premium discounts, and surcharges.325  In-
deed, it may encourage programs that require people to meet spe-
cific targets, such as losing a certain number of pounds, lowering 
their blood sugar to a particular level, or stopping smoking.   If 
enough employees do not participate in voluntary programs or fail 
to achieve health targets, will employers begin to require partici-
pation?  Or might employers find reasons to avoid hiring such in-
dividuals? 
Discriminatory employment practices, even if legal, are likely to 
hurt the most disadvantaged among us.  The target population for 
wellness programs overlaps to a substantial degree with the popu-
lation least able to afford health insurance.326  Chronic diseases, 
obesity, and tobacco use are more prevalent in the lower socioeco-
nomic classes than in the general population.327  About half of 
those with disabilities who work earn poverty-level wages.328  
While it might seem helpful to create financial incentives for them 
to reduce their health risks, they may be in the weakest position 
to do so.  If these individuals do not succeed in qualifying for dis-
counts or rewards, they will pay a larger share of their smaller 
income to obtain the same health insurance available to everyone 
else in the pool.   In the worst case, they will not find employment 
at all, yet income can be a better predictor of health than the 
health factors that wellness programs seek to improve. 
Employee programs that succeed in preventing illness may have 
value to employers for two reasons.  First, employers may save 
money in the short-term if employees are more productive and less 
prone to absenteeism.  Second, some costs of medical care may be 
shifted into the future, most probably after retirement, and onto 
the federal government, which pays the costs of Medicare.  Thus, 
while employers may gain some benefits, the government is likely 
to pay the costs.  How should this factor into the analysis?  There 
is no risk spreading between the public and private sector, except 
to the extent that employers and employees contribute Medicare 
and Social Security taxes.  To more fairly spread the risk between 
  
 325. Tu & Mayrell, supra note 67. 
 326. See Jacobi, supra note 188. 
 327. See Kristin Voigt, Smoking and Social Justice, 3 PUB. HEALTH ETHICS 91 (2010) 
(noting that a disproportionate number of smokers are from disadvantaged populations). 
 328. Peiyun She & Gina A. Livermore, MATERIAL HARDSHIP, POVERTY, AND 
DISABILITY AMONG WORKING-AGE ADULTS (2006). 
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employers and government, Medicare could be increased to com-
pensate the government for the additional expenses it is likely to 
incur as a result of the employer’s healthier employees.  This kind 
of risk spreading, of course, would surely be opposed by employers 
(and probably employees, too), who seek to reduce their costs, not 
increase their taxes.  Yet, it would more fairly represent the re-
sponsibility for health care across the population’s lifetime. 
VI.  PREVENTION OUTSIDE INSURANCE 
Situating the locus for health improvement at the level of the 
individual sends a message that individuals are responsible for 
their own health, regardless of the pressures and obstacles they 
face.  Whether this is true in any case depends upon the problem 
being addressed.  If the problem is that people don’t know their 
risks or the benefits they could receive by changing their behavior, 
then the solution is to let them know.  Whose responsibility is 
that?  It seems unlikely that employers and insurers should be the 
responsible party.  If the problem is that they understand their 
risk, but don’t change, whose problem is that?  Is there a duty to 
be healthy?  If it is a problem that endangers society as whole, 
such as irrational or violent behavior, government can justifiably 
control the individual.329  Here, however, the problem appears to 
be the cost of care.  The cost of care is determined more by health 
care providers than individuals.  If the government wants to re-
duce costs, it would be more effective to regulate those who set the 
fees, instead of spreading the costs back onto those who use the 
services. 
Behavior science literature demonstrates that it is especially 
difficult to engage in anything that feels like a deprivation today if 
the benefit is far in the future, as is the case with most wellness 
programs.330  For those who want to change, but need a push, the 
default system of paternalism may be welcome.  If the problem is 
the cost of care, however, we need better information about the 
relative costs of different health risks.  Moreover, it is difficult to 
rely on individuals to change their health status, because the fac-
  
 329. See Gard & Wright, supra note 224, at 181 (“Being defined as ‘overweight’ means 
that a whole range of institutions . . . are provided with the right and indeed the responsi-
bility to identify people so categorized, or people who might be ‘at risk’ of such categoriza-
tions, and to regulate their behaviors.”).  
 330. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 168. 
File: 271 Mariner Article REVISED_R2.doc Created on: 4/11/2012 11:17:00 AM Last Printed: 4/11/2012 11:38:00 AM 
Spring 2012 ACA & Health Promotion 327 
 
tors that mediate health status are numerous and complex, in-
cluding social conditions that promote inequality.331 
To the extent that responsibility for health rests with private 
insurance plans—private products—opportunities for improving 
health focus on micro-relationships between employee and em-
ployer or enrollee and insurer.  This excludes macro-level, struc-
tural social and economic influences on health, which can only be 
significantly modified by government action.  Such influences in-
clude the built environment, agricultural policy, and the changing 
diet produced by global food distribution.332  Most observers recog-
nize these macro influences, but changing them is a long, arduous 
process.  Thus, the focus remains on individual behavior, either as 
the fallback position or as a symbolic effort.  For example, after 
constructing several estimates of chronic disease costs, the World 
Economic Forum’s disappointing recommendations for “the ‘best 
buy’ interventions” for prevention were fourteen standard recom-
mendations for changing personal behavior, preventive medical 
care, taxes, and education.333  This has significant implications for 
social attitudes toward people who are not in good health.  Using 
insurance to attempt to modify their condition fosters the idea 
that they are at fault and must either change or pay a penalty.  
Social attitudes about personal responsibility for risk may perma-
nently change social norms and make it even more difficult to 
change the underlying environment.  Finally, it may further mar-
ginalize the disadvantaged by segregating them into a new class of 
the “unhealthy.”  
Currently, opinion polls indicate that the public is ambivalent 
about whether people with certain health risks should pay for in-
surance.  Some polls show that a majority believe that people who 
smoke or are overweight should pay higher insurance premiums 
  
 331. See supra note 118. 
 332. See, e.g., Mickey Chopra, Globalization and Food:  Implications for the Promotion of 
“Healthy” Diets, in GLOBALIZATION, DIETS & NONCOMMUNICABLE DISEASES (2002), avail-
able at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/9241590416.pdf; Corinna Hawkes, Uneven 
Dietary Development:  Linking the Policies and Processes of Globalization with the Nutrition 
Transition, Obesity and Diet-related Chronic Diseases, 2 GLOBALIZATION & HEALTH (2006); 
David Price, Allyson M. Pollock & Jean Shaoul, How the World Trade Organisation Is 
Shaping Domestic Policies in Health Care, 354 LANCET 1889 (1999). 
 333. BLOOM ET AL., supra note 8, at 37.  The recommendations were taxes on tobacco and 
alcohol, smoke-free workplaces and public places, health information, bans on tobacco and 
alcohol advertising and promotion, restricted access to alcohol, reduced salt intake, replac-
ing trans fats, mass advertising on diet and physical activity, counseling and drug therapy 
(including aspirin) for those at risk of cardiovascular disease, hepatitis B immunization, 
and screening and treatment of precancerous lesions to prevent cervical cancer.  Id. 
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because they will generate more health care costs.  Other polls 
find that the majority believe that such a practice would be un-
fair.334  The more people become habituated to the idea that health 
care costs are a matter of personal responsibility, the more likely 
they are to accept differential pricing.  And if differential pricing is 
acceptable, then perhaps more coercive measures can also be ac-
cepted.  The law’s protection of civil liberties makes clear that 
people should not be forced to do things that have negligible social 
benefit and certainly not solely for economic benefit.  So, govern-
ment can require people to get immunized against a severe, conta-
gious disease in order to prevent an epidemic, but cannot require 
people to take drugs as part of a research study that might benefit 
mankind, just because it would be cheaper to do so without getting 
their agreement.  Similarly, government cannot force a person into 
a housing project in order to save money, but can institutionalize a 
person who is dangerous to others by reason of a mental illness 
that makes it unlikely that he will be able to control his own vio-
lent behavior.  
Wellness program incentive systems range from minor and 
marginally effective, to major and possibly coercive.  The ACA’s 
wellness program exception represents an attempt to reconcile two 
inconsistent goals:  enabling penalties and rewards based on 
health risks without deviating from the general principle that 
health insurance should not be based on risk classifications.  Al-
though researchers are earnestly trying to find the combination of 
services and incentives that produce the best results, all programs 
(other than those providing free services and facilities) create in-
surance premiums based on an individual’s risk classification.  
The use of incentives to participate does not necessarily make a 
program voluntary, because rewards and penalties are two sides 
of the same coin.335  In short, the incentives permitted for wellness 
programs are likely to be too crude to significantly improve the 
population’s health or save money, and they pose an unnecessary 
threat to the underlying goals of the ACA.  They do not belong in 
an insurance system that avoids risk classification.  Instead, 
health insurance should cover all actual claims without adjust-
  
 334. Drop in Public Support of Higher Healthcare Costs for Smokers, Obese, ETHICS 
NEWSLINE (Inst. For Global Ethics, Rockport, Me.), Nov. 05, 2007, available at 
http://www.globalethics.org/newsline/2007/11/05/drop-in-public-support-of-higher-
healthcare-costs-for-smokers-obese/. 
 335. Mariner, supra notes 12; Erika Blacksher, Carrots and Sticks to Promote Healthy 
Behaviors:  A Policy Update, 38 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 13 (2008). 
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ments for risk factors that may or may not affect the claims rates.  
A better approach would eliminate the wellness program excep-
tion and rely on publicly available preventive and social services 
to promote health. 
So, what is the best way to share responsibility for improving 
the population’s health?  The market economy distributes private 
goods.  Public goods are typically distributed or regulated by gov-
ernment.  Public investments in health are generally believed to 
improve economic conditions and vice versa.336  The most effective 
ways to improve the population’s health are likely to lie in improv-
ing the social determinants of health.  In principle, there is sub-
stantial support for public programs to provide preventive ser-
vices, safer social and built environments, research, and educa-
tion.  As a result, a better question involves how government could 
make it possible for people to improve their health.  Publicly pro-
vided services have the advantage of being available to everyone, 
regardless of employment or insurance status.  Individuals can 
avail themselves of the services without being subjected to intru-
sive monitoring by employers.  This approach can encourage good 
health without penalizing those who either cannot improve or do 
not care to change.  The services could extend to other chronic dis-
eases of importance, like arthritis, Alzheimer’s disease, and de-
pression.337  Indeed, they could and should be coordinated with 
programs to increase employment and income and improve hous-
ing and education, which are likely to reduce health risks to a lar-
ger degree than insurance wellness programs.338  A community-
  
 336. William Jack & Maureen Lewis, Health Investments and Economic Growth:  Mac-
roeconomic Evidence and Microeconomic Foundations (World Bank, Working Paper 4877, 
2009). 
 337. Arthritis, back conditions, and heart disease accounted for 41% of disabilities in the 
United States in 2005.  OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., THE SURGEON GENERAL’S CALL TO ACTION TO IMPROVE THE HEALTH AND WELLNESS 
OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES (2005), available at http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/ 
library/disabilities/calltoaction/calltoaction.pdf.  See also Ronald C. Kessler et al., The Epi-
demiology of Major Depressive Disorder:  Results from the National Comorbidity Survey 
Replication, 289 JAMA 3095 (2003) (noting that depression is a major cause of disability). 
 338. See, e.g., WENDY E. PARMET, POPULATIONS, PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE LAW (2009); 
Jens Ludwig et al., Neighborhoods, Obesity, and Diabetes—A Randomized Social Experi-
ment, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1509 (2011) (explaining how women and children randomly 
assigned by HUD to receive vouchers to move to low-poverty housing areas slightly lowered 
their rates of obesity and high blood sugar, compared with those who did not receive vouch-
ers and could choose their own housing area); Communities Putting Prevention to Work:  
CDC Awards $372.8 Million to 44 Communities, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/features/chronicpreventiongrants/ (last visited Nov. 17, 
2011). 
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based or public health approach recognizes that promoting health 
is a social responsibility to make a healthy life possible, rather 
than an individual duty to stay healthy and save money.   
Employers can still play a role.  Those who offer free services, 
such as on-site fitness centers, safe buildings, and perhaps quiet 
rooms for napping or stress reduction exercises, as a benefit of 
employment independent of health insurance, should be rewarded, 
perhaps by tax deductions.  Employers might be encouraged to 
address issues beyond smoking and obesity, such as stress reduc-
tion, scheduling, and depression.339  But, by removing risk classifi-
cation from employee insurance plans, the potential for discrimi-
nation against employees is reduced. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The function of preventive care is to improve health, not neces-
sarily to save money.  This is a valuable goal in its own right.  The 
ACA’s encouragement of wellness programs, however, links health 
promotion to cost savings in ways that may be both ineffective and 
counterproductive.  The ACA frames health as a personal respon-
sibility, which is inconsistent with its overall goal of universal ac-
cess to health care.340  It encourages the use of public and private 
insurance to goad individuals to conform to behaviors that are be-
lieved to save money by preventing chronic diseases.  It is far from 
clear whether wellness programs can achieve those goals to any 
significant degree, both because the programs are highly variable 
in producing behavioral change and because substantial savings 
are unlikely over the long run. 
Skepticism about the value of wellness programs, however, is 
not an indictment of the goal of improving heath or encouraging 
the use of preventive services.  It is, rather, a critique of the use of 
insurance as the means to accomplish those goals.  Insurance re-
flects what we find socially acceptable, which risks we are willing 
to share, and which risks remain the responsibility of individuals.  
Insurance also shapes public perceptions of risk.  The United 
States has a history of characterizing health as a personal respon-
  
 339. See Walter F. Stewart et al., Cost of Lost Productive Work Time Among US Workers 
with Depression, 289 JAMA 3135 (2003). 
 340. CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Teversky eds., 2000). 
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sibility.341  The ACA can change that characterization by enabling 
everyone to have access to care without regard to why care is 
needed.  It can do so by eliminating risk classifications based on 
health status.342  The wellness program exception, however, rein-
troduces risk rating back into the insurance pool, but only for cer-
tain disfavored conditions.343  Its danger lies in encouraging the 
view that those conditions are personal faults that can be penal-
ized.  It can transform prejudices based on questionable data into 
justifiable classifications based on health.  One’s health status 
may become a socially acceptable basis for discrimination. 
 
  
 341. Stanley J. Reiser, Responsibility for Personal Health:  A Historical Perspective, 10 J. 
MED. PHIL. 7 (1985) (noting that historical trends in U.S. favored personal responsibility 
and self-sufficiency with limited government interference). 
 342. Mariner, supra note 40. 
  343.    Mariner, supra note 12. 
